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ABSTRACT 
Federal courts frequently confuse the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
with Younger abstention and preclusion law, often using these doc-
trines interchangeably to dismiss actions that would interfere with 
state court proceedings.  For years, scholars argued that the Supreme 
Court should alleviate this confusion by abolishing the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine altogether.  The Court recently refused to so, however.  In 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis, the 
Court reaffirmed Rooker-Feldman’s vitality and held that the doctrine 
plays a unique role, completely separate from abstention and preclu-
sion rules.  And yet these decisions leave a key question unanswered:  
Exactly how does Rooker-Feldman interact with Younger abstention and 
preclusion law?  This Article explores the relationship between these 
three doctrines, and articulates two unique roles that Rooker-Feldman 
can play.  First, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars federal 
court claims complaining of injuries caused by final state court judg-
ments.  Second, in the context of civil actions and claims for mone-
tary relief, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars litigants from 
collaterally attacking non-final judgments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In our federal system, state courts proceed independently of 
federal courts—the Framers of the Constitution “split the atom of 
sovereignty” by creating two court systems, “one state and one feder-
al, each protected from incursion by the other.”
1
  And yet, an inher-
ent tension exists between these two systems.  State and federal courts 
have concurrent jurisdiction over many claims, allowing litigants to 
bring actions in either forum.
2
  As a result, a state court loser often is 
tempted to seek relief in federal court.  These types of collateral at-
tacks happen with alarming frequency,
3
 demonstrating that hope 
springs eternal for many litigants.
4
 
 
 1 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  But see Mark R. Killenbeck, The Physics of Federalism, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 
4 (2002) (analyzing Justice Kennedy’s metaphor and arguing that “it is simply wrong 
to characterize what transpired [at the Constitutional Convention] as an exercise in 
splitting atoms, either as a matter of science or political theory”). 
 2 State courts can adjudicate federal law claims that would be within the federal 
question jurisdiction of the federal courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Tafflin v. 
Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).  Federal courts can adjudicate state law claims 
through diversity jurisdiction.  See id. § 1332. 
 3 See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D. 
Dec. 22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 
15, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010 WL 
5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010); Nali v. Oakland Cnty. Friend of Court, No. 10-
14844, 2010 WL 5101041 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2010). 
 4 See Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF 
ALEXANDER POPE 137, 139 (Henry W. Boynton ed., 1903) (“Hope springs eternal in 
the human breast”). 
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Because our system “could not function if state and federal 
courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case,”
5
 
several doctrines prohibit federal courts from interfering with state 
court actions.  The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts 
from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
6
  
Younger abstention requires dismissal of claims for injunctive or de-
claratory relief that would interfere with pending state court proceed-
ings.
7
  Additionally, preclusion law rules protect the finality of judg-
ments—claim preclusion bars parties from relitigating claims that 
were or could have been raised in a prior action,
8
 and issue preclu-
sion prohibits relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and de-
cided.
9
 
Unfortunately, federal courts frequently confuse Rooker-Feldman, 
Younger abstention, and preclusion law, often using the doctrines in-
terchangeably.
10
  Several scholars have argued that the Supreme 
Court should alleviate this confusion by abolishing Rooker-Feldman, al-
lowing preclusion and abstention doctrines to stand alone.
11
  They 
argue that Rooker-Feldman is superfluous—federal courts have no need 
for a doctrine that bars claims that also are prohibited under preclu-
sion law or Younger abstention.
12
  Indeed, some have suggested that 
 
 5 Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 286 (1970). 
 6 See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. 
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). 
 7 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). 
 8 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 10 Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1086, 1088 (1999) (“[L]ower courts have struggled 
to define [Rooker-Feldman’s] relationship to other doctrines, especially res judicata 
(and, to a lesser extent, Younger abstention).”); Rachel Thomas Rowley, Tenth Cir-
cuit Survey, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: A Mere Superfluous Nuance or a Vital Civil 
Procedure Doctrine? An Analysis of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Johnson v. Rodrigues, 78 
DENV. U. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000). 
 11 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground 
Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine should 
be abolished.”); Jack M. Beermann, Comment, Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let 
State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1999) (“The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine . . . lacks both a clear role and a clear justification.”); Gary Thomp-
son, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal Dis-
trict Courts, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 859, 861 (1990) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
unnecessary and potentially harmful.”). 
 12 See 18B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
4469.1 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2010) (stating that Rooker-Feldman “is nearly redundant 
because most of the actions dismissed for want of jurisdiction also could be resolved 
by invoking the claim- or issue-preclusion consequences of the state judgments”); 
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Rooker-Feldman might only be worth “the powder needed to blow it 
up.”
13
 
The Supreme Court recently disagreed.  In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis, the Court reaffirmed 
the vitality of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
14
  It also emphasized that 
“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name,”
15
 and 
“does not otherwise override or supplant” abstention doctrines.
16
  In 
other words, Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role, completely separate 
from preclusion and abstention.
17
 
However, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on 
how these doctrines interact, and lower federal courts continue to 
conflate Rooker-Feldman with preclusion
18
 and abstention.
19
  This con-
fusion has far-reaching consequences for hundreds of litigants.  Dur-
ing the last five years, more than 2,000 decisions have relied on vari-
ous combinations of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and 
preclusion law.
20
  Given how often courts invoke these doctrines, it is 
 
Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1129–30 (arguing that “[i]t is difficult to see 
what Rooker-Feldman contributes” in light of preclusion rules and Younger abstention). 
 13 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Foreword, Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Power to Blow 
It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1999) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). 
 14 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (elaborating on the circum-
stances in which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies). 
 15 Lance, 546 U.S. at 466; accord Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 n.11 
(2011). 
 16 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
 17 See Allison B. Jones, Note, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean to 
Be Inextricably Intertwined?, 56 DUKE L.J. 643, 656 (2006) (“The few scholars who find 
some value in the Rooker-Feldman doctrine perhaps have been vindicated by the Exxon 
Mobil decision, in which the Court demonstrated that it still perceived a niche for 
Rooker-Feldman not covered by any other existing doctrine.”). 
 18 See, e.g., Velardo v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 298 F. App’x 890, 892 (11th Cir. 
2008) (relying on prior circuit authority that conflates Rooker-Feldman with claim pre-
clusion’s bar against “federal claims that were, or should have been, central to the 
state court decision”); Dommisse v. Napolitano, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (D. Ariz. 
2007) (erroneously concluding that “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the district 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over claims that were not presented to the state 
court, if they could have been raised but were not”). 
 19 Courts repeatedly refer to the “Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine.”  See, e.g., 
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2010); Anderson v. Wade, 322 F. 
App’x 270, 271 (4th Cir. 2008); Velardo, 298 F. App’x at 892. 
 20 A Westlaw search of all federal cases showed that 2,018 cases decided between 
January 1, 2006, and January 1, 2011, contained at least two of the following three 
groups of phrases: (1) “Rooker Feldman”; (2) “claim preclusion,” “issue preclusion,” 
“res judicata,” or “collateral estoppel”; and (3) “Younger” within 20 words of “ab-
stain” or “abstention.” 
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somewhat surprising that scholars have not examined the relation-
ship between Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law 
since the Court’s Exxon Mobil decision, which significantly altered the 
framework for analyzing Rooker-Feldman issues.
21
 
This Article seeks to bridge that gap, by exploring the interac-
tion between jurisdiction, abstention, and finality in the federal 
courts and by articulating a unique role for the Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine.  Part I analyzes Rooker-Feldman, with an emphasis on recent Su-
preme Court decisions.  Although the Court has clarified that the 
doctrine applies only to claims “complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments,”
22
 uncertainties remain.  For example, it is un-
clear whether Rooker-Feldman applies to interlocutory state court or-
ders, and whether the doctrine bars claims that are “inextricably in-
tertwined” with a state court judgment.
23
 
Part II examines the circumstances in which federal courts must 
abstain under Younger.  Generally, federal district courts must dismiss 
claims for injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with a 
pending state court criminal prosecution or an ongoing state court 
civil action involving “important state interests.”
24
  It remains unclear, 
however, whether Younger applies only to claims for equitable relief 
or also bars claims for monetary damages. 
Part III analyzes interjurisdictional claim and issue preclusion.  
Because federal courts are required to give a state court judgment 
“the same effect that it would have in the courts of the State in which 
it was rendered,”
25
 the preclusive effect of state court judgments var-
ies, reflecting differences in state preclusion law.  As the discussion 
shows, state courts disagree on many of the fundamental elements of 
claim and issue preclusion. 
Part IV of this Article examines the interaction between the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and preclusion law.  
Each targets a distinct category of forbidden claims, and significant 
differences exist between these doctrines.  As the analysis demon-
 
 21 Before Exxon Mobil, a few scholars offered helpful observations on Rooker-
Feldman’s interaction with abstention and preclusion law principles.  See, e.g., Susan 
Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1175, 1177–78 (1999); Sherry, supra note 10, at 1090–97; Adam McLain, 
Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
1555, 1593–99 (2001); Rowley, supra note 10, at 329–34.  
 22 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 23 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 n.16 (1983); see infra 
Part II.C.  
 24 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). 
 25 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996). 
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strates, Rooker-Feldman will be unnecessary in some cases, but vitally 
important in others. 
Finally, Part V of this Article articulates two unique roles for the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  First, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that 
bars federal claims complaining of injuries caused by a final state 
court judgment.  Second, in the context of civil actions and claims for 
monetary relief, Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars litigants 
from collaterally attacking non-final state court judgments.  Thus, 
Rooker-Feldman fills an important niche among the doctrines available 
in federal court. 
II. JURISDICTION: THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prohibits federal district 
courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judg-
ments,
26
 arises from two jurisdictional statutes
27
 and two Supreme 
Court cases decided sixty years apart.
28
  Statutes grant the United 
States Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state 
court judgments,
29
 and grant federal district courts “original jurisdic-
tion,” not appellate jurisdiction.
30
  In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, the Supreme Court in-
terpreted these statutes and held that federal district courts do not 
have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.
31
 
After decades of confusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified 
the scope and proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.
32
 and Lance v. Dennis.
33
  
In those cases, the Court held that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doc-
trine, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and 
rejection of those judgments.”
34
 
 
 26 See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283–84. 
 27 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1331 (2006). 
 28 See Feldman, 460 U.S. 462; Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
 29 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest 
court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court by writ of certiorari . . . .”).   
 30 Id. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). 
 31 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 32 544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
 33 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). 
 34 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see discussion infra Part II.B. 
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A. The Supreme Court’s Decisions in Rooker and Feldman 
The Supreme Court has used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar 
jurisdiction only twice—once in Rooker and once in Feldman.
35
  Any 
analysis of the doctrine should begin with a careful examination of 
the facts of those two cases, which “exhibit the limited circumstances” 
in which the doctrine applies.
36
 
In the Rooker case, Dora and William Rooker initially lost two 
rounds of litigation in Indiana state courts.
37
  Not easily deterred, the 
Rookers filed an action in federal district court asking the court to 
declare the state court judgment “null and void” because it allegedly 
violated their federal due process and equal protection rights.
38
  The 
district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction.
39
  The Su-
preme Court affirmed the dismissal for two reasons.
40
  First, under 
federal jurisdictional statutes, only the Supreme Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over final state court judgments.
41
  Second, the statutory 
jurisdiction of the federal district courts is “strictly original,” not ap-
pellate.
42
  As a result, the Court held that federal district courts do not 
have subject-matter jurisdiction to “reverse or modify” state court 
judgments.
43
 
Feldman extended this rule to cases in which the litigant’s appeal 
is not as transparent as it was in Rooker.  In the Feldman case, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals denied Marc Feldman and Ed-
ward Hickey’s waiver applications from a bar admission rule.
44
  Feld-
 
 35 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486–87; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415–16. 
 36 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291. 
 37 The Rookers had deeded real estate to Fidelity Trust Company in exchange 
for a loan they failed to repay.  Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 771–72 (Ind. 
1921).  In the first round of litigation, the Indiana Supreme Court held that this 
agreement created a trust.  Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 768–70 (Ind. 
1915).  In the second round of litigation, the trial court ruled that Fidelity had “faith-
fully performed its duties as trustee.”  Rooker, 131 N.E. at 773.  The Indiana Supreme 
Court affirmed the judgment.  Id. at 776. 
 38 Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414–15. 
 39 Id. at 415. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 416 (“Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States 
other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [state court 
judgments].”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). 
 42 Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 43 Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416. 
 44 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 464–72 (1983).  The rule in 
question required District of Columbia bar applicants to demonstrate that they grad-
uated from an accredited law school.  See id. at 464–65.  Neither Feldman nor Hickey 
had done so.  Id. at 465. 
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man and Hickey then filed suit in federal district court, arguing that 
the District of Columbia court’s ruling violated their federal constitu-
tional rights.
45
  Although Feldman and Hickey refrained from styling 
their federal complaint as a blatant appeal, the Supreme Court none-
theless barred claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with the 
District of Columbia court’s decision.
46
 
Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts 
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that seek to “reverse or modi-
fy” a state court judgment (as in Rooker), as well as claims that are “in-
extricably intertwined” with the judgment (as in Feldman).
47
 
B. Requirements of a Narrow Doctrine: The Exxon Mobil Test 
For more than twenty years, the Supreme Court offered almost 
no guidance on Rooker-Feldman,
48
 allowing federal courts “ample room 
to improvise.”
49
  The doctrine experienced “explosive growth” in the 
lower federal courts,
50
 which viewed it as a convenient and powerful 
docket-clearing tool.
51
  During this time, however, courts applied 
Rooker-Feldman inconsistently, often confusing the doctrine with pre-
clusion and abstention rules.
52
 
 
 45 Id. at 468–71. 
 46 Id. at 486–87.  The Supreme Court noted that the federal district court had 
jurisdiction over Feldman and Hickey’s general challenges to the constitutionality of 
the bar admission rule because those claims did not require review of a judicial deci-
sion in a particular case.  Id. at 487. 
 47 See, e.g., Rowley, supra note 10, at 325 (“By adding this additional inquiry, the 
Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that were actually decided 
by the state court proceedings, to also include claims that were not litigated in the 
state court, and are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court.” (em-
phasis added)). 
 48 Between 1983 and 2005, only six Supreme Court decisions mentioned Rooker-
Feldman, and none of them used the doctrine to bar jurisdiction.  See Verizon Md. 
Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De 
Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005−06 (1994); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 n.16 
(1990); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 783 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 622 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 
U.S. 1, 7−8 (1987); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 49 Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.55 (2006). 
 50 McLain, supra note 21, at 1573 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51 Bandes, supra note 21, at 1175. 
 52 See, e.g., McLain, supra note 21, at 1573 (“[C]ourts are confused and conse-
quently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 11, at 880 (“Lower 
court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”). 
BUEHLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  12:20 PM 
562 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:553 
In 2005, the Supreme Court finally provided guidance on Rooker-
Feldman in Exxon Mobil, which articulates the narrow circumstances in 
which the doctrine applies.
53
  First, Rooker-Feldman is limited to “cases 
brought by state-court losers.”
54
  Second, the doctrine applies only to 
claims “complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and 
“inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
55
  
Third, Rooker-Feldman only protects “state-court judgments rendered 
before the district court proceedings commenced.”
56
 
1. Rooker-Feldman Applies to Cases Brought by State Court Losers 
Exxon Mobil unequivocally held that Rooker-Feldman is confined to 
cases brought by “state-court losers.”
57
  This requirement should come 
as no surprise—the Supreme Court had hinted at this limitation 
more than ten years earlier.
58
  Even after Exxon Mobil, however, lower 
federal courts infused preclusion law privity concepts into the Rooker-
Feldman analysis and extended the doctrine to cases brought by indi-
viduals who had not been parties in the state court action.
59
 
In response, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in 
Lance v. Dennis, emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman applies only to ac-
tions filed by state court losers.
60
  The Court held that the doctrine 
 
 53 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 54 Id.; see infra Part II.B.1. 
 55 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see infra Part II.B.2. 
 56 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see infra Part II.B.3. 
 57 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
 58 See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005–06 (1994) (characterizing 
Rooker-Feldman as a doctrine “under which a party losing in state court is barred from 
seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment” and con-
cluding that “the invocation of Rooker/Feldman is . . . inapt here, for unlike Rooker or 
Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state court”). 
 59 See, e.g., Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 89−90 (2d Cir. 
2005) (turning to preclusion law privity analysis to determine whether Rooker-Feldman 
barred an action filed by parties who had not been part of the state court action); 
Lance v. Davidson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1125 (D. Colo. 2005) (same), vacated sub 
nom. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam). 
 60 546 U.S. 459, 464.  In Lance, the Colorado General Assembly intervened as a 
defendant in a state court action filed by Colorado’s attorney general, who chal-
lenged the Assembly’s congressional redistricting plan.  Id. at 460.  After the Colora-
do Supreme Court invalidated the plan, several Colorado citizens filed a separate ac-
tion in federal district court, alleging that the state court decision violated federal 
law.  Id. at 460−61.  Although none of the federal plaintiffs had been parties to the 
state court proceedings, the federal district court held that the citizen-plaintiffs stood 
in privity with the General Assembly and barred the action under Rooker-Feldman.  
Lance, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 1123−27.  On direct review, the Supreme Court vacated the 
judgment.  Lance, 546 U.S. at 467.  
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“does not bar actions by nonparties simply because, for purposes of 
preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the 
judgment.”
61
  Although the Court was unwilling to foreclose the pos-
sibility that Rooker-Feldman might bar nonparty claims in exceptional 
circumstances,
62
 it nonetheless stressed that the doctrine “is not simp-
ly preclusion by another name.”
63
  Thus, Lance re-affirmed that Rooker-
Feldman generally does not bar federal claims by nonparties to the 
state court action. 
2. Rooker-Feldman Applies if the Federal Action Complains of an In-
jury Caused by a State Court Judgment, and Seeks Review and 
Rejection of that Judgment 
Exxon Mobil limits the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to “cases . . . com-
plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting 
district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
64
  This state-
ment contains two separate but related inquiries.  First, courts must 
examine “the source of the plaintiff’s injury”
65
 in order to determine 
whether “the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, 
the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.”
66
  If so, 
Rooker-Feldman bars the claim.
67
  For example, the doctrine prevents a 
litigant from suing a state court judge in federal court for injuries 
 
 61 Lance, 546 U.S. at 466. 
 62 See id. at 466 n.2 (“[W]e need not address whether there are any circumstanc-
es, however limited, in which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not 
named in an earlier state proceeding—e.g., where an estate takes a de facto appeal in a 
district court of an earlier state decision involving the decedent.”). 
 63 Id. at 466.  The Court reasoned that “[i]ncorporation of preclusion principles 
into Rooker-Feldman risks turning that limited doctrine into a uniform federal rule gov-
erning the preclusive effect of state-court judgments, contrary to the Full Faith and 
Credit Act,” which requires “federal courts to look principally to state law in deciding 
what effect to give state-court judgments.”  Id. 
 64 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 65 Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d 
Cir. 2010); accord Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 606 
F.3d 301, 309−10 (6th Cir. 2010).  “A useful guidepost is the timing of the injury, that 
is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court 
proceedings and thus could not have been ‘caused by’ those proceedings.”  Great W. 
Mining, 615 F.3d at 167. 
 66 Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1237 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation, 
internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted); see also Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 
97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009); Skit Int’l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d 1154, 
1157 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 67 See, e.g., Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87−88 (2d Cir. 
2005) (providing illustrative examples). 
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caused by a state court judgment.
68
  In contrast, the doctrine does not 
bar a litigant from filing claims that complain of injuries caused by a 
defendant or a third party, rather than a state court judgment.
69
 
Second, Rooker-Feldman applies only if the plaintiff’s claim invites 
the district court to “review and reject” the state court judgment.
70
  
This criterion is met when a plaintiff blatantly requests reversal or 
nullification of a state court decision
71
 or requests relief that would 
“otherwise ‘undo’” the state court remedy.
72
  However, the doctrine 
“does not prohibit federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction 
where the plaintiff’s claim is merely a general challenge to the consti-
tutionality of the state law applied in the state action,”
73
 nor does it 
apply in other situations in which the federal district court does not 
need to directly reject a state court judgment.
74
 
 
 68 See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D. 
Dec. 22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 
15, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010 WL 
5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010). 
 69 See, e.g., PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2010).  Because some ag-
grieved state court litigants attempt to circumvent Rooker-Feldman through artful 
pleading, courts apply the doctrine to “federal suits that profess to complain of injury 
by a third party, but actually complain of injury produced by a state-court judgment 
and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.”  Great W. Mining, 615 
F.3d at 167 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 70 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 71 See, e.g., Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) (barring a 
claim that asked the federal district court to “order that the proceedings in Family 
Court in case number D181580 be dismissed with prejudice”); Lawrence v. Welch, 
531 F.3d 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2008) (barring a claim that sought a declaration that the 
state decision “impermissibly impinges upon protected federal rights” (quoting Joint 
Appendix at 28, Lawrence, 531 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1026)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). 
 72 PJ ex rel. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1193 (quoting Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 
F.3d 1229, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 73 Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hood v. Keller, 
341 F.3d 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 74 See, e.g., Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Exxon Mo-
bil, 544 U.S. at 293) (holding that Rooker-Feldman did not bar claims arising out of a 
state court order temporarily removing plaintiff’s child from her custody because 
“[p]laintiff’s child has been returned to her, and thus she plainly has not repaired to 
federal court to undo the Family Court judgment” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). 
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3. Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court Judgments Rendered Before 
the Commencement of the Federal Action 
Rooker-Feldman applies only when the state court rendered its de-
cision before the commencement of the federal action.
75
  The facts of 
Exxon Mobil illustrate this requirement: in that case, Rooker-Feldman 
did not apply because the state court issued its decision after the 
plaintiffs had already filed an action in federal district court.
76
  Intui-
tively, this result makes sense—if the state court has not rendered a 
decision by the time the federal action is filed, then the federal action 
is not an appeal of a state court judgment, and Rooker-Feldman should 
play no role. 
It remains unclear, however, which state court “judgments” trig-
ger the protections of Rooker-Feldman after Exxon Mobil.  Some circuits 
apply the doctrine only to final state court judgments.
77
  In these cir-
cuits, the doctrine does not protect interlocutory orders,
78
 nor does it 
apply to judgments that can be modified or appealed in state court.
79
  
Other circuits extend Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders and low-
er state court decisions.
80
  This approach prevents federal court plain-
tiffs from collaterally attacking preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings 
on pretrial motions, and other non-final state court orders.
81
 
 
 75 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
 76 In Exxon Mobil, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) sued two Exx-
onMobil subsidiaries in Delaware state court.  Id. at 289.  ExxonMobil and its subsidi-
aries immediately countersued SABIC in federal district court.  Id.  Thus, from the 
beginning, there was parallel litigation in state and federal court.  When the state 
court rendered its judgment nearly three years later, the Third Circuit dismissed the 
federal action under Rooker-Feldman.  Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 
F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[w]hen 
there is parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by 
the entry of judgment in state court.”  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292. 
 77 E.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re 
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Amos v. Glynn Cnty. Bd. of 
Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that Rooker-Feldman 
requires a “prior state court ruling [that] was a final or conclusive judgment on the 
merits”). 
 78 See, e.g., TruServ, 419 F.3d at 591. 
 79 E.g., Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Hodges, 
350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 80 E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. 
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Richardson v. D.C. 
Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 81 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
federal plaintiff cannot challenge a state court’s denial of a motion for recusal); Pie-
per, 336 F.3d at 459, 464−65 (Rooker-Feldman bars federal court review of a state court 
order staying litigation); Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473−75 (10th 
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Several circuits recently have adopted an intermediate approach, 
in which Rooker-Feldman protects some state court interlocutory orders 
but not others.
82
  Relying on dicta from Exxon Mobil,
83
 these courts ap-
ply the doctrine if the state court has rendered an order that is suffi-
ciently “final” for Supreme Court review or if the parties have volun-
tarily ceased litigation in state court prior to the commencement of 
the federal action.
84
 
Thus, although courts agree that Rooker-Feldman protects final 
state court judgments rendered before the commencement of the 
federal action, the circuits are split as to whether the doctrine also 
protects state court interlocutory orders. 
C. It is Unclear What Role (if Any) Feldman’s “Inextricably Intertwined” 
Test Plays in the Rooker-Feldman Analysis 
Although Exxon Mobil and Lance clarify the scope of Rooker-
Feldman, neither decision invokes Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” 
test as part of the Court’s analysis.
85
  As a result, it is unclear what role 
 
Cir. 2002) (holding that a federal plaintiff cannot collaterally attack a state court or-
der granting temporary and permanent injunctions), abrogated by Exxon Mobil, 544 
U.S. 280.   
 82 See, e.g., Guttman, 446 F.3d at 1032 & n.2; Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 
924 (8th Cir. 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del 
Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23−25 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 83 Courts adopting the intermediate approach point to the Supreme Court’s ob-
servation in Exxon Mobil that “the state proceedings [had] ended” in both Rooker and 
Feldman.   Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  And yet the 
plaintiff in Exxon Mobil filed its federal action “well before any judgment in state 
court,” final or interlocutory.  Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added).  The 
final-versus-interlocutory distinction clearly was not at issue in that case. 
 84 Specifically, courts adhering to the intermediate approach apply Rooker-
Feldman in the following circumstances: (1) “when the highest state court in which 
review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be re-
solved”; (2) when “the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks fur-
ther action”; or (3) when the state courts “have finally resolved all the federal ques-
tions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions (whether great or 
small) remain to be litigated.”  Federación, 410 F.3d at 24−25. 
 85 Exxon Mobil references the words “inextricably intertwined” only when sum-
marizing the holding of Feldman.  See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 286 & n.1, 291.  Lance 
refers to the test only when summarizing the district court’s decision.  See Lance v. 
Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 462 (2006) (per curiam); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Ed-
ward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analy-
sis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) 
(“[T]he previously prominent ‘inextricably intertwined’ test did absolutely none of 
the work” [in Exxon Mobil].”). 
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the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry plays in the Rooker-Feldman 
analysis.
86
 
Lower federal courts apply a variety of inconsistent iterations of 
the “inextricably intertwined” test, almost all of which were developed 
before the Exxon Mobil and Lance decisions.
87
  Some courts follow a 
broad approach and bar any claims that require a federal court to 
disagree with a state court’s prior determination on an issue.
88
  Other 
courts follow a narrow approach originally adopted by the Seventh 
Circuit and refuse to apply Rooker-Feldman as long as the plaintiff ad-
vances “some independent claim,” even if that claim requires the fed-
eral court to disagree with a legal conclusion that the state court 
reached.
89
  A few decisions continue to conflate Rooker-Feldman with 
claim preclusion, holding that claims are “inextricably intertwined” if 
they could have been raised in state court.
90
 
Many courts have relegated the “inextricably intertwined” in-
quiry to a secondary role or have discarded it altogether.  Under the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach, courts must first conclude that the plain-
tiff’s federal action seeks relief from a state court judgment; only then 
can they decide which claims are “inextricably intertwined” with that 
judgment.
91
  And in the last few years an increasing number of cir-
cuits have concluded that the “inextricably intertwined” phrase has 
no independent meaning but “merely states a conclusion”—if claims 
 
 86 By referring to the “inextricably intertwined” test without overruling or alter-
ing it, the Court appears to at least assume the legitimacy of the inquiry.  See Jones, 
supra note 17, at 659–60. 
 87 See id. at 660–74 (summarizing the various approaches to the “inextricably in-
tertwined” test used by lower federal courts). 
 88 See, e.g., Parker v. Potter, 368 F. App’x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2010); ADSA, Inc. v. 
Ohio, 176 F. App’x 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); Untracht v. Weimann, 141 F. App’x 46, 
48–49 (3d Cir. 2005).  This approach originated in Justice Marshall’s concurrence in 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.  481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment if the federal 
claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues be-
fore it.”). 
 89 GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993); accord 
Todd v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 434 F.3d 432, 436–37 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 90 See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, No. 08-11589, 2008 WL 4657823, at *1 (11th Cir. 
Oct. 20, 2008) (per curiam); McMahon v. Wash. State Bank, No. 05-C-122-S, 2005 WL 
1648204, at *2 (W.D. Wis. July 13, 2005). 
 91 See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ignacio v. Judges 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
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meet Exxon Mobil’s requirements, they are, “by definition, ‘inextrica-
bly intertwined’ with the state-court decision.”
92
 
To the extent that the “inextricably intertwined” test survived the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
appear to have the only viable approaches.
93
  Exxon Mobil’s statement 
that Rooker-Feldman does not apply as long as the federal action “pre-
sents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclu-
sion that a state court has reached,”
94
 suggests a narrow definition of 
“inextricably intertwined” and is flatly inconsistent with a broad in-
terpretation of that phrase.
95
  Moreover, after the Court’s emphasis in 
both Exxon Mobil and Lance that “Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclu-
sion by another name,”
96
 it is inappropriate to use rules from preclu-
sion law when analyzing whether claims are “inextricably inter-
twined.”
97
 
In sum, Rooker-Feldman recognizes that federal district courts are 
courts of original jurisdiction, not appellate jurisdiction.  The doc-
trine bars federal claims that seek to reverse or modify state court 
judgments, but it remains unclear whether it also bars “inextricably 
intertwined” claims as well.  In any event, Rooker-Feldman applies only 
in “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused 
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceed-
 
 92 Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006); accord Great 
W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 170 (3d Cir. 2010); E. 
Hill Synagogue v. City of Englewood, 240 F. App’x 938, 941 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007); 
McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394–95 (6th Cir. 2006); Bolden v. City of 
Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006); States Res. Corp. v. Architectural 
Team, Inc., 433 F.3d 73, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2005); Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 422 F.3d 77, 86–87 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 93 Exxon Mobil cited decisions applying the Seventh and Ninth Circuit “inextri-
cably intertwined” tests, apparently with approval.  See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi 
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005) (citing GASH, 995 F.2d at 728; Noel, 341 
F.3d at 1163–64). 
 94 Id. (alterations, internal quotations, and citations omitted); accord Skinner v. 
Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011). 
 95 See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 15 n.64 (arguing that, after Exxon 
Mobil, “federal courts should not apply the [inextricably intertwined] concept expan-
sively”); Jones, supra note 17, at 676 (noting that the broad “Marshall approach to 
‘inextricably intertwined’ does not appear to survive Exxon Mobil”).  
 96 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam); accord Exxon Mobil, 
544 U.S. at 284 (“Rooker-Feldman does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion 
doctrine . . . .”). 
 97 See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 17 (“What [lower federal courts] 
should avoid, as the recent follow-up Lance decision makes clear, is general resort to 
preclusion law even as an aid in determining applicability of Rooker-Feldman.”); Jones, 
supra note 17, at 675 (noting that after Exxon Mobil, “[i]t is clear that the res judicata 
approach is no longer a viable option”). 
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ings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 
those judgments.”
98
 
III. ABSTENTION: THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE 
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts 
must abstain when a plaintiff requests injunctive relief that would in-
terfere with a pending state court criminal prosecution.
99
  In subse-
quent cases, the Court dramatically expanded the Younger doctrine.
100
  
In its modern form, the doctrine protects not only criminal proceed-
ings, but also ongoing state court civil actions involving important 
state interests,
101
 as long as there is an adequate opportunity to raise 
constitutional claims.
102
  Some aspects of Younger abstention remain 
unclear, however.  Most notably, courts disagree as to whether Young-
er is limited to claims for equitable relief or bars damages claims as 
well.
103
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Younger v. Harris 
In the Younger case, the District Attorney for Los Angeles County 
prosecuted John Harris, Jr. in state court, under California’s Criminal 
Syndicalism Act.
104
  Harris filed an action in federal district court re-
questing injunctive relief against the pending state criminal prosecu-
tion.
105
  The district court invalidated the Criminal Syndicalism Act on 
First Amendment grounds and enjoined the state court proceed-
ings.
106
 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that federal courts can-
not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings, absent excep-
 
 98 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. 
 99 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 39–41 (1971); see also discussion infra Part 
III.A. 
 100 See infra Part III.B. 
 101 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). 
 102 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982). 
 103 See infra Part III.C. 
 104 Younger, 401 U.S. at 39–41.  California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act defined 
“criminal syndicalism” as “any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and 
abetting the commission of crime, sabotage . . . , or unlawful acts of force and vio-
lence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in in-
dustrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change.”  Id. at 38 n.1 (quot-
ing CAL. PENAL CODE § 11400 (West 1971) (repealed 1991)).  
 105 Id. at 38–39. 
 106 Id. at 40. 
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tional circumstances.
107
  Basing its decision on “primary sources” un-
derlying the interaction between state and federal courts, the Court 
invoked notions of comity
108
 and “Our Federalism”—”the belief that 
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institu-
tions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways.”
109
  The Court also relied on the basic principle that “courts 
of equity should not act . . . when the moving party has an adequate 
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equita-
ble relief.”
110
  Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held that the dis-
trict court erred when it enjoined the state prosecution against Har-
ris.
111
 
 
 107 Id. at 41.  “[S]pecial circumstances” justifying a departure from this rule in-
clude repeated bad-faith prosecutions and enforcement of statutes that are “flagrant-
ly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sen-
tence and paragraph.”  Id. at 41, 53–54; see also Comment, Limiting the Younger 
Doctrine: A Critique and Proposal, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1318, 1328–31 (1979) (discussing 
the exceptions to Younger).  The Younger opinion cites Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 
479 (1965), as an example of the type of harassment through bad-faith prosecutions 
that would justify an injunction against state proceedings.  See Younger, 401 U.S. at 
47–49; see also Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103 (1977). 
 108 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.  “Comity encompasses the notion that, based on 
judicial courtesy and deference, the courts of one jurisdiction will give credit and ef-
fect to the laws and judicial holdings of courts from another jurisdiction.”  Mathew 
D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal Court Intervention, 28 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 1115 n.84 (1998); see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and 
Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549–50, 581 (1985) (noting that Younger is “[t]he 
present-day heir” to a tradition in which “comity concerns . . . led English courts to 
refuse to enjoin proceedings in Scotland, even though Scottish and English courts 
are tribunals of the same sovereign”). 
 109 Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.  For historical background on the Supreme Court’s 
use of the phrase “Our Federalism” prior to Younger, see Aviam Soifer & H.C. 
Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1165 
n.124 (1977); see also Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our 
Federalism”, 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 703–12 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the con-
cept of “Our Federalism”). 
 110 Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–44.  Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not base its 
decision on the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides that “[a] court of the United 
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as ex-
pressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or 
to protect or effectuate its judgments.”  28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).  The Court’s reluc-
tance to rely on this statute makes more sense in light of its subsequent decision in 
Mitchum v. Foster, in which the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an “expressly au-
thorized” exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.  407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).  Thus, the 
Anti-Injunction Act did not bar Harris’s § 1983 claim. 
 111 Younger, 401 U.S. at 49.  After observing that Harris had an opportunity to 
raise his constitutional claims in the pending state court proceedings, the Court not-
ed that “[t]here is no suggestion that this single prosecution against Harris is 
brought in bad faith or is only one of a series of repeated prosecutions to which he 
will be subjected.”  Id. 
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Although commentators generally agree with Younger’s equity ra-
tionale,
112
 they have vigorously debated whether it was wise for the 
Court to rely on notions of comity and federalism.
113
  Paul Bator has 
defended the Court’s rationale, arguing that “especially sensitive po-
litical nerves are likely to be touched if federal judges are free to en-
join—or to declare unconstitutional—state court enforcement pro-
ceedings.”
114
  However, many scholars view Younger’s reliance on 
comity and federalism as misguided.  For example, John Gibbons has 
criticized Younger’s “strident antinational tone,”
115
 and Aviam Soifer 
and H.C. Macgill have argued that the Supreme Court’s notion of 
comity and federalism “reflects an obsessive concern with conflict be-
tween the state and national sovereigns,” which “turns out in practice 
to be a mandate to federal courts to give way.”
116
 
Thus, Younger draws on principles of equity, comity, and federal-
ism and prohibits federal district courts from enjoining ongoing state 
court criminal proceedings.  The doctrine is a powerful forum-
allocation device—it shifts federal constitutional claims to state 
 
 112 Shapiro, supra note 108, at 579–80 (“[C]ourts and commentators generally 
agree that there may be powerful reasons to withhold injunctive relief when simpler 
and less intrusive remedies are at hand.”).  But see Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at 
1143 (arguing that the rigidity of the Younger doctrine “has eliminated the discre-
tionary balancing at the heart of equity”). 
 113 The scholarship on this debate is voluminous.  See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The 
State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); 
Fiss, supra note 107; Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MICH. L. 
REV. 530 (1989); John J. Gibbons, Our Federalism, 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1087 (1978); 
Wayne McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of 
Constitutional Claims, 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974); Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of 
Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 463 (1978); S. 
Stephen Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of  Younger v. Harris, 59 B.U. L. 
REV. 597 (1979); Jeffrey M. Shaman & Richard C. Turkington, Huffman v. Pursue, 
Ltd.: The Federal Courthouse Door Closes Further, 56 B.U. L. REV. 907 (1976); Soifer & 
Macgill, supra note 109; Ralph U. Whitten, Federal Declaratory and Injunctive Interference 
with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Limits of Judicial Discretion, 53 
N.C. L. REV. 591 (1975). 
 114 Bator, supra note 113, at 620.  Bator further argued that “[i]f we want state 
judges to feel institutional responsibility for vindicating federal rights, it is counter-
productive to be grudging in giving them the opportunity to do so . . . .  Let us be-
ware of breeding the very attitudes of cynicism and hostility which we fear.”  Id. at 
625. 
 115 Gibbons, supra note 113, at 1105.  Gibbons argued that the Supreme Court’s 
conception of federalism disregards several notable historical events, including “the 
Civil War, the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Acts, the federal jurisdictional 
grants of the Reconstruction era, and the civil rights legislation of the 1960’s.”  Id. at 
1104. 
 116 Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at 1185–86. 
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courts, even though federal courts would otherwise have jurisdic-
tion.
117
 
B. Clarification and Extension of the Younger Doctrine 
In the years following the Younger decision, the Supreme Court 
extended the scope of abstention well beyond the facts of that case.
118
  
As a result, Younger abstention now applies if three basic require-
ments are met.
119
  First, there must be an “ongoing state judicial pro-
ceeding” at the time the federal claim is filed.
120
  Second, the state 
proceeding must “implicate important state interests.”
121
  Third, there 
must be “an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise 
constitutional challenges.”
122
 
1. Younger Protects Pending State Court Proceedings 
Federal courts are required to abstain under Younger only if 
there are “pending” state court proceedings at the time the federal 
action is filed.
123
  As a general rule, Younger does not bar federal 
 
 117 See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between 
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1249 (2004) (noting that Younger 
“serves to allocate cases to state court consistent with the state’s enforcement interest, 
while simultaneously denying access to federal court, despite the existence of federal 
interests”). 
 118 See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal 
Court Deference to State Court Proceedings: A Response to Professor Stravitz, 58 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 173, 184 (1989) (“The Supreme Court has extended Younger dramatically to bar 
injunctions of civil proceedings which implicate important state interests when ade-
quate relief is available in the state court.  In addition, Younger has been applied to 
declaratory and other forms of relief.”). 
 119 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982). 
 120 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 121 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 122 See infra Part III.B.3. 
 123 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).  A pending prosecution 
obviously exists if officials have filed formal charges or if there has been an indict-
ment returned in state court.  See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) 
(“Appellee Harris has been indicted, and was actually being prosecuted by California 
. . . at the time this suit was filed.”).  Some lower courts have also suggested that an 
arrest by state officials triggers Younger abstention.  See Rialto Theater Co. v. City of 
Wilmington, 440 F.2d 1326, 1326–27 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Eve Prods., Inc. v. 
Shannon, 439 F.2d 1073, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).  But see Agriesti v. 
MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 53 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that there 
were “no ongoing state judicial proceedings” for Younger purposes when plaintiffs 
filed their federal claim after being arrested). 
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courts from enjoining future criminal prosecutions,
124
 nor does it pre-
vent a federal court from granting declaratory relief in the absence of 
ongoing state court proceedings.
125
 
And yet, a litigant cannot stave off abstention merely by winning 
the race to the courthouse door.  Even when the federal action is 
filed first, Younger nonetheless applies if a state court prosecution 
commences prior to “proceedings of substance on the merits” in the 
federal action.
126
  For example, a federal district court must abstain if 
it has done nothing but deny a temporary restraining order at the 
time state proceedings begin.
127
  Similarly, a federal district court’s 
consideration of abstention issues is not a proceeding of substance on 
the merits for purposes of Younger.
128
  In contrast, a federal court’s 
grant of a preliminary injunction is sufficient to render Younger inap-
plicable.
129
 
State court proceedings remain “pending” for purposes of the 
Younger doctrine until the losing party exhausts all state appellate 
remedies.
130
  The Supreme Court has reasoned that “[v]irtually all of 
the evils at which Younger is directed would inhere in federal inter-
vention prior to completion of state appellate proceedings.”
131
  A par-
ty is not excused from this exhaustion requirement merely because 
there is little chance for success on appeal.
132
  Moreover, a state court 
 
 124 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975); see also Ex parte Young, 209 
U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908) (noting that a federal court in equity may enjoin “officers of 
the state . . . who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil 
or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act”). 
 125 Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462–63.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, a contrary 
rule would “place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting 
state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally pro-
tected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.”  Id. 
at 462. 
 126 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975). 
 127 Id. at 338–39, 349–50. 
 128 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 436–
37 (1982). 
 129 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984).  These cases lead to 
an inescapable conclusion: state prosecutors can veto the federal forum if they im-
mediately file charges after receiving notice that someone under investigation has 
brought an action in federal court.  See Fiss, supra note 107, at 1135–36 (arguing that 
the Younger doctrine vests district attorneys with “a reverse removal power”). 
 130 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). 
 131 Id.  The Court later clarified that Younger requires exhaustion of state appel-
late remedies only when the federal claim is “designed to annul the results of a state 
trial,” not when the relief sought by the federal court plaintiff would be “wholly pro-
spective,” merely “preclud[ing] further prosecution.”  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 
705, 711 (1977). 
 132 See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 610. 
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loser cannot circumvent Younger by allowing the time for filing an 
appeal to elapse.
133
 
2. Younger Applies if the Pending State Court Proceeding Involves 
Important State Interests 
Although Younger involved a pending state court criminal prose-
cution,
134
 the Supreme Court has extended the holding of that case to 
a limited number of state court civil proceedings—namely, civil en-
forcement actions filed by state officials and private civil litigation 
implicating “important state interests.”
135
 
First, Younger protects civil enforcement actions filed by state of-
ficials.
136
  For example, in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., the Court used 
Younger to prohibit a federal district court from enjoining a govern-
ment-initiated state court civil nuisance action.
137
  Similarly, in Trainor 
v. Hernandez, the Court held that Younger barred federal courts from 
interfering with a civil fraud action filed by state officials.
138
  Although 
the Court has refused to make “general pronouncements upon the 
applicability of Younger to all civil litigation,”
139
 the doctrine undoubt-
edly applies to civil enforcement actions “brought by the State in its 
sovereign capacity.”
140
 
 
 133 Id. at 611.  Scholars have criticized the implications of this exhaustion re-
quirement.  See, e.g., Soifer & Macgill, supra note 109, at 1200 (“The introduction in 
Huffman of a requirement for exhaustion of state appellate remedies did not elimi-
nate the distinction between pending and non-pending proceedings, but it expand-
ed the notion of pendency toward the point at which the distinction is insignifi-
cant.”). 
 134 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). 
 135 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 832–57 (5th ed. 2007) 
(discussing the Court’s expansion of Younger to civil proceedings). 
 136 See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET 
AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1122 (6th ed. 
2009) (noting that Trainor appears to “extend Younger more broadly to encompass all 
civil enforcement actions brought by the state”). 
 137 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 595–98, 604–05. 
 138 Trainor, 431 U.S. at 435–36, 444. 
 139 Huffman, 420 U.S. at 607. 
 140 Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444.  It is important to note that Younger abstention only 
protects civil enforcement actions brought by state officials.  In contrast, “it has never 
been suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial pro-
ceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.”  New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. 
Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989); see also FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra 
note 136, at 1123 (noting that Younger apparently “does not extend to challenges to 
completed legislative or executive actions that do not require, or have not yet led to, 
enforcement suits”). 
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Second, the Supreme Court has extended Younger to private 
state court civil actions when the litigation implicates “important state 
interests.”
141
  Such interests exist when civil proceedings “bear a close 
relationship to proceedings criminal in nature,”
142
 or when they are 
“necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the 
functioning of the state judicial system.”
143
  For example, in Juidice v. 
Vail, the Court held that Younger barred federal courts from enjoining 
state court contempt procedures in a civil action between private par-
ties because “[t]he contempt power lies at the core of the administra-
tion of a State’s judicial system.”
144
  Likewise, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco 
Inc., the Court used Younger to prevent a federal district court from 
interfering with the execution of a state court judgment rendered in 
a private civil action, citing “the importance to the States of enforcing 
the orders and judgments of their courts.”
145
  Because the state court 
proceedings in both cases involved important state interests, the fed-
eral courts were required to abstain under Younger.
146
 
3. Younger Applies Only if the State Court Proceedings Provide an 
Adequate Opportunity to Raise Constitutional Challenges 
The Supreme Court also has emphasized that Younger applies 
only when the state court proceedings offer the parties an adequate 
opportunity to raise constitutional claims.
147
  The Younger decision it-
 
 141 E.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979) (noting that the “basic concern” 
underlying Younger “is also fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important 
state interests are involved”). 
 142 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982). 
 143 Id.; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 368 (noting that Younger extends 
to “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the 
state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions”). 
 144 430 U.S. 327 (1977) (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604). 
 145 481 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1987). 
 146 Some commentators have suggested that Pennzoil may extend Younger to all 
civil proceedings.  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 848.  This does not ap-
pear to be the case.  The Pennzoil Court explicitly refused to extend Younger to all civ-
il actions.  Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14 n.12 (“Our opinion does not hold that Younger ab-
stention is always appropriate whenever a civil proceeding is pending in a state court.  
Rather, as in Juidice, we rely on the State’s interest in protecting the authority of the 
judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory.” (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 147 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432; accord Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 
415, 432 (1979) (applying Younger, in part because “the appellees have not shown 
that state procedural law barred presentation of their claims”). 
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self mentioned this limitation on federal court abstention.
148
  This re-
quirement appears to presume the existence of parity, a concept that 
recognizes that “state courts are equal to federal courts in their ability 
and willingness to protect federal constitutional rights.”
149
 
Although the concept of parity has sparked a rigorous academic 
debate,
150
 the Supreme Court has repeatedly assumed its veracity.
151
  
As a result, federal courts considering abstention under the Younger 
doctrine employ a strong presumption that the ongoing state court 
proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to adjudicate federal 
claims.
152
  Even when a plaintiff does not raise her federal claims in 
state court, federal courts must “assume that state procedures will af-
ford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority 
to the contrary.”
153
 
 
 148 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (“The accused should first set up 
and rely upon his defense in the state courts, even though this involves a challenge of 
the validity of some statute, unless it plainly appears that this course would not afford 
adequate protection.” (quoting Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240, 244 (1926)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
 149 Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (1988). 
 150 Compare, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1121–
28 (1977) (arguing that federal courts are superior to state courts), with William B. 
Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 612–21 (1999) (rebut-
ting Neuborne’s argument and arguing that state courts have yielded better results in 
the specific context of gay-rights claimants).   
 151 See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1988) 
(“[W]hen a state proceeding presents a federal issue, . . . the proper course is to seek 
resolution of that issue by the state court.”); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 
(1988) (rejecting the “assumption that the States cannot be trusted to enforce feder-
al rights with adequate diligence” as “inappropriate” (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 493–94 n.35 (1976))). 
 152 See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (“We cannot assume 
that state judges will interpret ambiguities in state procedural law to bar presentation 
of federal claims.”); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975) (“Appellee is 
in truth urging us to base a rule on the assumption that state judges will not be faith-
ful to their constitutional responsibilities.  This we refuse to do.”). 
 153 Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15; see also id. at 16 n.16 (noting that a litigant “cannot 
escape Younger abstention by failing to assert its state remedies in a timely manner”).  
Martin Redish has criticized this approach, arguing that the Supreme Court is willing 
to conclude that a litigant did not have an opportunity to raise a federal claim in 
state court “only in those rare cases in which the entire state judicial process is glar-
ingly inadequate.”  Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of 
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 108–09 (1984); see also Douglas Laycock, Federal 
Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective Relief, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 
194 (“[I]n many cases the criminal defense cannot provide an adequate remedy, be-
cause the criminal court cannot grant interlocutory, prospective, or class relief.”). 
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C. Although Younger Bars Actions Seeking Injunctive or Declaratory Re-
lief, it is Unclear Whether the Doctrine Applies to Claims for Damages 
Although the Younger case involved injunctive relief, the doctrine 
bars other equitable remedies as well.  In Samuels v. Mackell, a deci-
sion rendered on the same day as Younger, the Supreme Court held 
that, absent “unusual circumstances,” federal courts cannot grant de-
claratory relief if doing so would interfere with pending state court 
prosecutions.
154
  The Court noted that “a declaratory judgment issued 
while state proceedings are pending might serve as the basis for a 
subsequent injunction,” in which case it would “result in precisely the 
same interference with and disruption of state proceedings” underly-
ing Younger’s rationale.
155
 
However, it remains unclear whether Younger also bars claims for 
monetary damages.
156
  The Supreme Court has noted the existence of 
this issue several times without resolving it.
157
  Most recently, the Su-
preme Court suggested in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co. that 
abstention doctrines may apply in civil actions for damages, but only 
to justify a stay rather than dismissal or remand of the action.
158
  How-
ever, that case involved Burford abstention,
159
 not Younger abstention, 
and the Court ultimately found it unnecessary to elaborate on the 
 
 154 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (“[W]here an injunction would be impermissible un-
der [Younger’s] principles, declaratory relief should ordinarily be denied as well.”).  
The Court admitted in Samuels that “[t]here may be unusual circumstances in which 
an injunction might be withheld because, despite a plaintiff’s strong claim for relief 
under the established standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive 
or offensive; in such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate.”  Id. at 
73. 
 155 Id. at 72.  Some jurists and scholars have questioned the Court’s reasoning in 
Samuels.  See, e.g., Whitten, supra note 113, at 655 (arguing that the Court’s rationale 
in Samuels “flies squarely in the face of the intent of the draftsmen of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act as well as the Court’s prior decisions holding that the declaratory rem-
edy is not to be administered in accord with traditional equity rules”). 
 156 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 10, at 1092 n.34 (“The Supreme Court has so far 
declined to decide whether a suit for monetary damages comes within the Younger 
doctrine.” (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988))). 
 157 See Deakins, 484 U.S. at 202; Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984); Juidice 
v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 339 n.16 (1977). 
 158 517 U.S. 706, 721 (1996). 
 159 Burford abstention, arising from the Supreme Court’s decision in Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), applies in federal court cases when state law is un-
clear and “there is a need to defer to complex state administrative procedures.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 802.  
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circumstances in which abstention doctrines might apply in civil ac-
tions for monetary damages.
160
 
Most circuits have extended Younger to claims for monetary 
damages,
161
 with the caveat that federal courts should stay such ac-
tions, instead of dismissing them outright.
162
  And yet some courts 
have held that Younger abstention does not apply when a federal liti-
gant seeks monetary damages rather than equitable relief.
163
  This 
split in authority does not appear to produce different results, how-
ever.  Even when courts refuse to apply Younger to damages claims, 
they tend to stay those claims pending resolution of the state court 
action.
164
  Nevertheless, an increasing number of federal courts are 
using Younger to bar damages claims.
165
 
 
 160 See Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 731.  Michael Gibson suggests that the Court’s 
efforts to “finesse its way out of” this “major quandary” may be intentional.  Michael 
T. Gibson, Private Concurrent Litigation in Light of Younger, Pennzoil, and Colorado 
River, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 233–34 (1989).  On one hand, application of 
Younger to civil actions for monetary damages could dramatically restrict a federal 
court’s ability to hear cases in which there are ongoing state court proceedings—the 
doctrine would suddenly apply to a large number of cases, regardless of whether they 
are “equitable or legal, criminal or civil.”  Id. at 234.  On the other hand, if the Court 
explicitly confirms that the doctrine does not apply to civil actions for monetary 
damages, “adroit criminal defense lawyers quickly would learn to avoid Younger by 
adding a claim for legal relief to their federal court complaints.”  Id. 
 161 See, e.g., Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 
1998); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n.1 (1st Cir. 1992); Traverso 
v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989); Doby v. Strength, 758 F.2d 1405, 1406 
(11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).  See generally E. Martin Estrada, Pushing Doctrinal Lim-
its: The Trend Toward Applying Younger Abstention to Claims for Monetary Damages and 
Raising Younger Abstention Sua Sponte on Appeal, 81 N.D. L. REV. 475 (2005). 
 162 See, e.g., Rossi v. Gemma, 489 F.3d 26, 37–38 (1st Cir. 2007); D.L. v. Unified 
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); Yamaha Motor Corp., 
U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603–04 (8th Cir. 1999); Carroll, 139 F.3d at 1076; 
Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138–39 (7th Cir. 1995).  There is some variation 
among these courts as to the proper application of Younger to damages claims.  For 
example, some circuits “have adopted rules that appear to require a stay, regardless 
of whether the specific relief is available in state court,” while other circuits “make 
the decision to stay or dismiss contingent on considerations such as whether or not 
the relief is available in state court.”  Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 980 n.15 
(9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
 163 E.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d Cir. 
2009); Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 164 E.g., Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have held 
that abstention and dismissal are inappropriate when damages are sought, . . . but 
that a stay of the action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be appropri-
ate.”); Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating 
that Younger does not apply to damages claims, but staying the action nonetheless). 
 165 See Estrada, supra note 161, at 475 (describing the “sweeping” expansion of 
Younger in the lower federal courts). 
BUEHLER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2012  12:20 PM 
2012] UNIQUE ROLE FOR ROOKER-FELDMAN 579 
In sum, federal courts must abstain under Younger when pending 
state court proceedings implicate important state interests and must 
provide an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges.  
In those circumstances, the doctrine prohibits claims for injunctive 
and declaratory relief.  It remains unclear, however, whether Younger 
also bars damages claims that interfere with state court proceedings. 
IV. FINALITY: CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION 
The Full Faith and Credit Act provides that state court judicial 
proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every court 
within the United States.”
166
  The statute requires that federal courts 
give a state court judgment “the same effect that it would have in the 
courts of the State in which it was rendered”
167
—federal courts cannot 
give greater or lesser preclusive effect than the law of the rendering 
state would allow.
168
  Thus, unlike the application of the Rooker-
Feldman and Younger abstention doctrines, the preclusive effect of 
state court judgments will vary state by state.
169
 
Courts resort to two preclusion doctrines—claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion.  Both require a valid, final judgment on the mer-
its.
170
  Claim preclusion bars the same parties or their privies from 
relitigating claims that were or could have been raised in the prior ac-
tion.
171
  In contrast, issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues that 
were actually litigated and decided, and essential to the prior judg-
 
 166 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
 167 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).  See generally 
18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 133.30[1] (3d ed. 2008); 
18B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 4469. 
 168 E.g., Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) 
(“It has long been established that § 1738 does not allow federal courts to employ 
their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments.”); Haring 
v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 313 n.6 (1983) (“If the state courts would not give preclusive 
effect to the prior judgment, ‘the courts of the United States can accord it no greater 
efficacy.’” (quoting Union & Planters’ Bank of Memphis v. Memphis, 189 U.S. 71, 75 
(1903))); see also Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378; Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). 
 169 See Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV. 945, 
1012 n.335 (1998) (“Recent Supreme Court cases involving state-federal preclusion 
have emphasized that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires federal courts to apply the preclu-
sion law of the state that rendered the judgment.” (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235–41 (1998); Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 373; Marrese, 470 U.S. 
380; Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982))). 
 170 See infra Part IV.A. 
 171 See infra Part IV.B. 
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ment.
172
  Although there is much agreement across jurisdictions, state 
courts disagree on many of the fundamental elements of claim and 
issue preclusion.  Most notably, state courts sharply disagree whether 
issue preclusion requires mutuality of parties.
173
 
A. Preclusion Requires a Valid, Final Judgment on the Merits 
Claim and issue preclusion apply only if there is a valid, final 
judgment on the merits.
174
  Judgments are “valid” if the rendering 
court had jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties.
175
  A “final” 
judgment “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for 
the court to do but execute the judgment.”
176
  An order is “on the 
merits” for purposes of preclusion when it “passes directly upon the 
substance of a particular claim before the court”
177
 rather than dispos-
ing of the matter “on a procedural ground.”
178
 
Because preclusion doctrines apply only to final judgments, it is 
well settled that interlocutory orders have no preclusive effect.
179
  
 
 172 See infra Part IV.C. 
 173 See infra Part IV.D. 
 174 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982).  See generally 
RICHARD D. FREER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 536–42 (2d ed. 2009).  
 175 E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and 
Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 764 (1986).  Howev-
er, “there appears to be a trend toward recognizing judgments as preclusive in some 
circumstances even if the [rendering court] lacked jurisdiction.”  FREER, supra note 
174, at 536 n.20. 
 176 Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 419 (2008) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 
324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b 
(1982) (“[A] judgment will ordinarily be considered final [for claim preclusion] if it 
is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps 
in the adjudication of the claim by the court . . . .”); id. § 27 cmt. k (referencing § 13 
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for the requirement of finality in the context 
of issue preclusion).  But see Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“It is widely recognized that the finality requirement is less stringent for issue pre-
clusion than for claim preclusion.”). 
 177 Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501–02 (2001) (in-
ternal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 
167, § 131[3][a] (noting that a judgment is “on the merits” when “it is rendered up-
on consideration of the legal claim, as distinguished from consideration of an objec-
tion to subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, service of process, venue, or 
any other ground that does not go to the legal or factual sufficiency of the claim to 
relief”). 
 178 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 687 (4th ed. 2005). 
 179 See, e.g., Moran v. Svete, 366 F. App’x 624, 628–29 (6th Cir. 2010); Saizan v. 
Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App. 2010); McMahon v. 
Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); B & T Distribs., Inc. v. White, 
325 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Tex. App. 2010). 
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There is a split in authority, however, regarding the effect an appeal 
has on the finality of a judgment.
180
  Most states follow the approach 
articulated by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments (“Second Restate-
ment”)
181
 and give preclusive effect to a judgment regardless of wheth-
er an appeal is pending or could be filed.
182
  Nonetheless, several 
states refuse to give preclusive effect to a judgment that is subject to a 
pending appeal.
183
 
B. Claim Preclusion Bars the Same Parties or Their Privies from 
Relitigating Claims that Were or Could Have Been Raised in the Prior 
Action 
The doctrine of claim preclusion, traditionally known as “res ju-
dicata,” recognizes that “a final judgment on the merits of an action 
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were 
or could have been raised in that action.”
184
  Such claims are 
“merged” into any judgment favorable to the plaintiff;
185
 likewise, a 
judgment in favor of the defendant “bars” plaintiff from 
relitigating.
186
 
Beyond the necessity of a final judgment on the merits, there are 
a few other requirements for claim preclusion.  First, claim preclu-
sion applies only when the same parties to the prior action—or their 
 
 180 Erichson, supra note 169, at 972–73. 
 181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. f (1982) (“[A] judgment oth-
erwise final remains so despite the taking of an appeal . . . .”). 
 182 E.g., Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003); Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 
866, 869 n.6 (D.C. 1999); Johnson v. Ward, 265 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Iowa 1978); Bart-
lett v. Pullen, 586 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Me. 1991); Campbell v. Lake Hallowell Home-
owners Ass’n, 852 A.2d 1029, 1039–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Baltrusch v. 
Baltrusch, 130 P.3d 1267, 1275 (Mont. 2006); Shaffer v. Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 874–75 
(Pa. 1996); Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 724 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1986); State v. Har-
rison, 61 P.3d 1104, 1109–10 (Wash. 2003). 
 183 See, e.g., People ex rel. Gow v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 161 Cal. Rptr. 
562, 568 (Ct. App. 1980); Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005); Greene 
v. Transp. Ins. Co., 313 S.E.2d 761, 763−64 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); Dupre v. Floyd, 825 
So. 2d 1238, 1240–41 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam); Petition of Donovan, 623 
A.2d 1322, 1324 (N.H. 1993); Benham v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1990); 
Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78 (Tenn. 2009); Faison v. Hudson, 417 
S.E.2d 302, 305 (Va. 1992); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, 513 S.E.2d 692, 703 (W. Va. 1998). 
 184 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).  See generally Edward W. Cleary, Res 
Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948). 
 185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 & cmt. a (1982). 
 186 Id. § 19. 
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privies—attempt to relitigate claims.
187
  Although “privity is an amor-
phous concept that is difficult to define,”
188
 it generally exists only 
when a nonparty has a significant and relevant legal relationship with 
a party, agrees to be bound by the court’s judgment, exercises control 
over the litigation, or other such circumstances are present.
189
 
Second, claim preclusion bars parties or their privies from 
relitigating the “same claim.”
190
  Courts disagree on the meaning of 
this requirement.
191
  Most states apply a broad “transactional test,” 
under which claims are precluded if they arise from “any part of the 
transaction, or series of connected transactions” underlying claims in 
the prior action.
192
  Some states apply claim preclusion more narrow-
ly, however, using various “same claim” tests.
193
  For example, Califor-
nia state courts use the “primary rights” test,
194
 under which “the 
claimant has a separate claim (and therefore can file a separate case) 
for each right violated by the defendant.”
195
 
Despite these differences, courts agree that claim preclusion 
“applies not only to claims actually litigated, but also to claims which 
 
 187 E.g., Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 
1154 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Household Int’l, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 286 F. 
Supp. 2d 369, 374 n.7 (D. Del. 2003); Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 
393, 398 (Iowa 1998); N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 
1995). 
 188 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 131.40[3][a]; see also FREER, supra note 174, 
at 566 (“‘Privity’ is a slippery word, encrusted with historical baggage.”).    
 189 See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39–42 (1982); 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 131.40. 
 190 E.g., Ross ex rel. Ross v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 486 F.3d 279, 
283 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Oregon, 470 F.3d 809, 817 (9th Cir. 2006); Ca-
mus v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 151 P.3d 678, 680 (Colo. App. 2006); Huffey v. 
Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992). 
 191 See Erichson, supra note 169, at 973–74. 
 192 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982); see, e.g., Fink v. Golenbock, 
680 A.2d 1243, 1249–50 (Conn. 1996); Town of Ogunquit v. Cliff House & Motels, 
Inc., 759 A.2d 731, 735 (Me. 2000); Chavez v. City of Albuquerque, 952 P.2d 474, 479 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1997). 
 193 See Erichson, supra note 169, at 974. 
 194 See, e.g., Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 348 (Cal. 2010). 
 195 FREER, supra note 174, at 543.  Howard Erichson provides an illustrative ex-
ample of the differences between these “same claim” tests: 
     The classic example comparing the broad and narrow definition of 
a claim involves a plaintiff’s assertion of personal injury and property 
damage in separate lawsuits, usually following a motor vehicle accident.  
Under federal and majority law, the later suit is precluded because the 
claims arise out of the same transaction.  A few states, however, treat 
personal injury and property damage as separate claims and thus allow 
their assertion in separate lawsuits. 
Erichson, supra note 169, at 974. 
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could have been litigated during the first proceeding.”
196
  This particular 
facet of claim preclusion gives the doctrine a potentially broad scope 
in many cases in which parties seek to relitigate claims.
197
 
C. Issue Preclusion Bars Relitigation of Issues that Were Actually Litigated 
and Determined, and Essential to the Judgment in the Prior Action 
Issue preclusion, also known as “collateral estoppel,” generally 
stands for the proposition that “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actu-
ally litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is con-
clusive in a subsequent action between the parties.”
198
  As this state-
ment indicates, the requirements for issue preclusion differ some-
what from those of claim preclusion. 
Most significantly, issue preclusion only prevents relitigation of 
the same issues that were “actually litigated” and “necessarily decid-
ed” in the prior action.
199
  Courts generally consider similar factors 
when determining whether the lawsuits involve the “same” issues for 
purposes of issue preclusion.
200
  There is sharp disagreement, howev-
er, regarding the point at which issues have been “actually litigated.”  
For example, some states give default judgments issue preclusive ef-
fect in some circumstances,
201
 while others do not.
202
 
 
 196 Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 153 (3d Cir. 
2008) (emphasis added); accord Linn v. NationsBank, 14 S.W.3d 500, 503 (Ark. 
2000); Topps v. State, 865 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Fla. 2004); Andrus v. Nicholson, 186 
P.3d 630, 633 (Idaho 2008); Longval v. Comm’r of Corr., 861 N.E.2d 760, 764–65 
(Mass. 2007); Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 2009); Bain v. Hof-
mann, 993 A.2d 432, 434 (Vt. 2010). 
 197 See Gene R. Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1209, 
1212 (1986) (“Whether the entire claim . . . was actually put forward in the prior case 
is immaterial; what matters is whether it could have been put forward.”). 
 198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
 199 E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001); Gonzalez v. 
Superior Court of Santa Clara Cnty., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85 (Ct. App. 2010); 
Tonko v. Mallow, 154 P.3d 397, 405 (Colo. 2007); Robert v. O’Meara, 813 N.Y.S.2d 
736, 737 (App. Div. 2006). 
 200 Relevant factors include the relationship between claims, the overlap of factu-
al evidence, arguments and legal rules, and whether pretrial preparations in the first 
action would “reasonably be expected to have embraced” the issue presented in the 
second action.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982). 
 201 See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Kest, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 33–34 (Ct. App. 2006); Jackson v. 
R.G. Whipple, Inc., 627 A.2d 374, 380 (Conn. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by 
Macomber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Corp., 804 A.2d 180 (Conn. 2002); TransDulles 
Ctr., Inc. v. Sharma, 472 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Va. 1996). 
 202 See, e.g., Wall v. Stinson, 983 P.2d 736, 740 (Alaska 1999); Circle K Corp. v. In-
dus. Comm’n of Ariz., 880 P.2d 642, 645 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Treglia v. MacDonald, 
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Courts also disagree regarding the circumstances in which a de-
cision on an issue is “essential to the judgment.”
203
  In particular, 
courts disagree on whether alternative findings and holdings meet 
the essentiality requirement.
204
  Some courts follow the approach of 
the Second Restatement and refuse to give preclusive effect to alterna-
tive holdings.
205
  Other courts, however, follow the earlier Restatement 
(First) of Judgments approach and treat alternative holdings as “essen-
tial to the judgment” for purposes of issue preclusion.
206
 
Despite these disagreements, the requirements of issue preclu-
sion highlight a significant difference between that doctrine and 
claim preclusion—“claim preclusion bars any claim that could have 
been litigated”; in contrast, “[i]ssue preclusion bars any claim based 
on facts that were actually litigated.”
207
 
D. Courts Disagree Whether Issue Preclusion Requires Mutuality of Parties 
As mentioned earlier, claim preclusion applies only to claims be-
tween the same parties to the prior action or their privies.
208
  Issue 
 
717 N.E.2d 249, 253 (Mass. 1999); In re Sandoval, 232 P.3d 422, 424–25 (Nev. 2010); 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. e (1982) (“In the case of a 
judgment entered by confession, consent, or default, none of the issues is actually 
litigated.”). 
 203 To determine essentiality, courts generally ask whether a contrary finding on 
the issue in the first action would have affected the judgment.  See FREER, supra note 
174, at 561. 
 204 See, e.g., id. at 563; Erichson, supra note 169, at 969.  See generally Jo Desha Lu-
cas, The Direct and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Alternative Holdings, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 701 
(1983). 
 205 See, e.g., Schultz v. Bos. Stanton, 198 P.3d 1253, 1257–58 (Colo. App. 2008); 
Dowling v. Finley Assocs., Inc., 727 A.2d 1245, 1252 (Conn. 1999); Caprock Inv. 
Corp. v. Montgomery, 321 S.W.3d 91, 97 (Tex. App. 2010); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. i (1982) (“If a judgment of a court of first instance 
is based on determinations of two issues, either of which standing independently 
would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive with respect 
to either issue standing alone.”). 
 206 See, e.g., Magnus Elecs., Inc. v. La Republica Arg., 830 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1986); Tydings v. 
Greenfield, Stein & Senior, LLP, 843 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540–41 (App. Div. 2007); see also 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 cmt. n (1942) (“Where the judgment is 
based upon the matters litigated as alternative grounds, the judgment is determina-
tive on both grounds, although either alone would have been sufficient to support 
the judgment.”). 
 207 David Gray Carlson, The Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351, 353 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 208 See, e.g., FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 178, at 723 (“When new parties are 
involved, the courts generally have ruled that the two actions do not constitute a sin-
gle cause of action or claim and thus are not barred by res judicata.”). 
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preclusion traditionally adhered to the same requirement, under the 
rule of “mutuality.”
209
  Mutuality prohibits a litigant from “assert[ing] 
issue preclusion from a judgment unless she was bound by the same 
judgment—that is, unless she was a party or in privity with a party to 
the initial action.”
210
 
After the California Supreme Court rejected mutuality in its 
1942 decision in Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Ass’n,
211
 courts started breaking away from that requirement, applying 
issue preclusion to situations in which a person bound by a judgment 
attempts to relitigate a previously decided issue against a 
“nonmutual” party—someone who had not been a litigant in the prior 
action.
212
  There are two situations in which a nonmutual party might 
want to invoke issue preclusion: (1) as a nonmutual defendant, to pre-
vent a plaintiff bound by a prior judgment from relitigating an issue 
(“defensive” issue preclusion), or (2) as a nonmutual plaintiff, to pre-
vent a defendant bound by a prior judgment from relitigating an is-
sue (“offensive” issue preclusion).
213
  The Supreme Court has con-
doned the use of both offensive and defensive nonmutual issue 
preclusion within the context of federal preclusion law.
214
 
 
 209 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); Tobias Barrington Wolff, 
Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 781 n.196 (2005) (“Mutu-
ality of parties was . . . a consistent and ubiquitous prerequisite for preclusion at 
common law.”). 
 210 Erichson, supra note 169, at 965; accord Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Note, Preclud-
ing the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1380 
n.5 (1994) (“In general, the doctrine of mutuality required that res judicata would 
operate only where both litigants (or their privies) were parties to the first suit.”); see 
also Wystan M. Ackerman, Note, Precluding Defendants from Relitigating Sentencing Find-
ings in Subsequent Civil Suits, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 128, 131 (2001) (“The rationale be-
hind the ‘mutuality’ rule, often criticized, was that nonmutual issue preclusion was 
unfair because the party seeking to assert preclusion would not have been bound if 
the other party had won on the issue in the previous suit.”); Note, Exposing the Extor-
tion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 
1943–60 (1992) (applying an economic analysis to the mutuality debate). 
 211 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942) (“No satisfactory rationalization has been ad-
vanced for the requirement of mutuality.”). 
 212 See generally Brainerd Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. 
REV. 25 (1965) (discussing Bernhard’s departure from the mutuality requirement with 
an appendix of similar decisions from other states). 
 213 See, e.g., Erichson, supra note 169, at 951 n.22 (defining offensive and defen-
sive nonmutual issue preclusion); Note, Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Against States, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 792, 792 n.4 (1996) (same). 
 214 Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (permitting offensive 
nonmutual issue preclusion); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 
U.S. 313 (1971) (permitting defensive nonmutual issue preclusion). 
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State courts are split regarding the mutuality requirement.
215
  
Many states have abandoned mutuality altogether and allow both of-
fensive and defensive nonmutual issue preclusion.
216
  Some states 
permit defensive issue preclusion in certain contexts but do not allow 
offensive issue preclusion.
217
  And several states still require mutuality 
and do not allow nonmutual issue preclusion.
218
  Thus, application of 
the mutuality requirement varies greatly between states.
219
 
In sum, claim preclusion bars parties from relitigating claims 
that were or could have been raised in a prior action; issue preclusion 
prohibits relitigation of issues that were actually litigated and decid-
ed.  Both require a valid, final judgment on the merits.  As the pre-
ceding discussion illustrates, however, states disagree on the details of 
several of these requirements.  As a result, the preclusive effect of 
state court judgments in federal courts varies, reflecting these differ-
ences in state preclusion law. 
 
 215 See Erichson, supra note 169, at 965–69; E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Mutuality 
of Estoppel as Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to a Stranger to the 
Judgment, 31 A.L.R.3D 1044 (1970). 
 216 See, e.g., Briggs v. Newton, 984 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Alaska 1999); Riverdale Dev. 
Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark. 2004); Exotics Hawai’i-Kona, 
Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d 250, 263 (Haw. 2004); Preferred Am. 
Ins. v. Dulceak, 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Tofany v. NBS Imaging Sys., 
Inc., 616 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ind. 1993); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 709 N.W.2d 114, 
117–18 (Iowa 2006); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 37 (Me. 1991); Rymer 
v. Estate of Sorrells, 488 S.E.2d 838, 840 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997); McPherson v. S.C. 
Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 376 S.E.2d 780, 781–82 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). 
 217 See, e.g., Campbell v. SZL Props., Ltd., 62 P.3d 966, 968 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); 
Keywell & Rosenfeld v. Bithell, 657 N.W.2d 759, 788 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002); Goodson 
v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 987 (Ohio 1983); Mullins v. State, 
294 S.W.3d 529, 539 n.9 (Tenn. 2009); see also Adamson v. Hill, 449 P.2d 536, 540 
(Kan. 1969) (“[C]ourts are more inclined to permit use of the doctrine as a ‘shield’ 
by one not a party to the action, but not as a ‘sword’.”). 
 218 See, e.g., McCarty v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 335, 338 (S.D. 
Miss. 1980) (applying Mississippi law); E.L. Hamm & Assocs., Inc. v. Sparrow, 306 
B.R. 812, 826 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (applying Virginia law); Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So. 2d 158, 165 (Ala. 2001); Ritch v. 
State, 14 So. 3d 1104, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Wickliffe v. Wickliffe Co., 489 
S.E.2d 153, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, 498 
P.2d 265, 273 (Kan. 1972); Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 297–98 
(Mich. 1990); U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 576 S.E.2d 415, 417–18 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 219 See Erichson, supra note 169, at 965 (“The most important split in preclusion 
law concerns mutuality.”). 
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V. DISTINGUISHING THE DOCTRINES 
In Exxon Mobil and Lance, the Supreme Court “demonstrated 
that it still perceived a niche for Rooker-Feldman not covered by any 
other existing doctrine.”
220
  This affirmation of the vitality of Rooker-
Feldman likely will put an end to the frequent attempts by judges and 
scholars to bury the doctrine.
221
  Going forward, courts and commen-
tators should shift their focus to two questions.  First, exactly how 
does Rooker-Feldman interact with Younger abstention and preclusion 
law rules?  Second, what unique role does Rooker-Feldman play in pre-
venting federal court interference with state court litigation? 
To answer these questions, we initially must tease out the subtle 
differences in the application of these doctrines.
222
  The following dis-
cussion examines the most significant divergences.  First, the applica-
bility of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion law de-
pends in large part on the status of the state court proceedings at the 
time the federal suit is filed.
223
  Second, these doctrines diverge in 
federal cases involving nonparties to the state court proceeding.
224
  
Third, the doctrines apply differently in civil cases than they do in 
criminal cases.
225
  Finally, Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and the 
preclusion law doctrines each bar a distinct category of federal court 
claims.
226
 
 
 220 Jones, supra note 17, at 656; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) 
(per curiam) (“Rooker-Feldman is not simply preclusion by another name.”); Exxon 
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that 
Rooker-Feldman “does not otherwise override or supplant” abstention doctrines). 
 221 That said, it appears that some of Rooker-Feldman’s detractors do not intend to 
withdraw quietly.  See Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 
317, 317–18 (2006) (publishing a mock obituary for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, an-
nouncing that “Mr. Feldman” had died on February 21, 2006—the date the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in Lance—and tersely observing that “[i]t is hoped that 
he leaves no survivors”); see also Lance, 546 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (sug-
gesting that the Court’s Exxon Mobil opinion had “finally interred the so-called Rooker-
Feldman doctrine”). 
 222 Of course, one difference is that Rooker-Feldman is jurisdictional, while the 
other doctrines are not.  Rowley, supra note 10, at 332–33.  This distinction certainly 
has important consequences.  See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 21, at 1177–78.  However, 
it does not assist us in articulating unique roles for each of these doctrines. 
 223 See infra Part V.A. 
 224 See infra Part V.B. 
 225 See infra Part V.C. 
 226 See infra Part V.D. 
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A. Status of the State Court Proceedings at the Time the Federal Action is 
Filed 
The applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger absten-
tion, and preclusion law largely depends on the status of the state 
court proceedings when the federal court action is filed.
227
  The fol-
lowing chart lists four case scenarios that demonstrate how the status 
of state court proceedings affects the availability of these doctrines.
228
 
 
Status of State Court Proceedings at the Time of Filing: 
Which Doctrine (if Any) Bars the Federal Court Claim? 
 
Scenario Rooker-Feldman 
Younger
abstention Preclusion 
1.  State court action pending; no 
trial court orders 
Does not bar 
claim 
Bars 
claim 
Does not bar 
claim 
2.  State trial court interlocutory or-
der; no final order 
Might bar 
claim 
Bars 
claim 
Does not bar 
claim 
3.  State trial court final judgment; 
appeal pending 
Probably bars 
claim 
Bars 
Claim 
Might 
bar claim 
4.  State appellate remedies exhaust-
ed 
Bars claim Does not bar 
claim 
Bars 
claim 
 
In the first scenario, the plaintiff files her federal action after the 
commencement of state court litigation, but before the state trial 
court issues any final or interlocutory decisions.  Younger requires ab-
stention because there is a “pending” state court proceeding.
229
  Nei-
ther Rooker-Feldman nor preclusion law, however, bars the federal ac-
tion because there is no state court judgment.
230
 
In the second scenario, the federal action is filed after the state 
trial court issues an interlocutory order, but before the court issues a 
final judgment.  As in the last example, Younger applies because there 
 
 227 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman applies only when the state court rendered its judgment 
“before the district court proceedings commenced”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 
452, 460–61 (1974) (noting that Younger applies only when there are “pending” state 
court proceedings); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982) (“The rules of 
res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment is rendered.”); id. § 27 & cmt. 
k (setting forth the requirement of a final judgment for issue preclusion). 
 228 These scenarios assume that the other requirements for Rooker-Feldman, 
Younger abstention, and preclusion are met—the only variable is the status of the 
state court proceedings at the time the federal action is filed. 
 229 See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 460–61. 
 230 See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294 (refusing to apply Rooker-Feldman because 
plaintiff commenced its federal action “well before any judgment in state court”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13, 27 cmt. k (1982). 
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are proceedings pending in state court.
231
  Preclusion does not bar 
the federal suit because interlocutory orders have no preclusive ef-
fect.
232
  It is uncertain whether Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal 
court of jurisdiction in this situation.  Some circuits use that doctrine 
to bar collateral attacks on interlocutory orders,
233
 while others do 
not.
234
 
In the third scenario, an action is filed in federal court after the 
state trial court renders a final judgment, but before state courts de-
cide an appeal of that judgment.  Younger applies because state court 
proceedings remain “pending” until the exhaustion of state appellate 
remedies.
235
  Most federal courts apply Rooker-Feldman to lower state 
court decisions,
236
 although a few circuits do not.
237
  Preclusion may or 
may not apply, depending on whether the rendering state’s law gives 
preclusive effect to a judgment while an appeal is pending.
238
 
Finally, in the fourth scenario, the plaintiff files a federal action 
after exhausting her appeals in state court.  Both Rooker-Feldman and 
preclusion law apply because there is a final state court judgment.
239
  
 
 231 See Steffel, 415 U.S. at 460–61. 
 232 E.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct. App. 
2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 233 E.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003); Am. 
Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 234 E.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re 
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 235 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). 
 236 E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462; Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 
1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 237 E.g., Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009); In re Hodges, 
350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 238 Compare Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 825, 831 (Alaska 2003) (judgments have pre-
clusive effect regardless of whether an appeal is pending), and Campbell v. Lake Hal-
lowell Homeowners Ass’n, 852 A.2d 1029, 1039–40 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) 
(same), with Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005) (judgments on appeal 
do not have preclusive effect), and Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78 
(Tenn. 2009) (same). 
 239 See, e.g., Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de 
P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[I]f a state court decision is final enough that 
the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over a direct appeal, then it is final enough 
[under Rooker-Feldman] that a lower federal court does not have jurisdiction over a col-
lateral attack on that decision.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b 
(1982) (“[W]hen res judicata is in question a judgment will ordinarily be considered 
final in respect to a claim . . . if it is not tentative, provisional, or contingent and rep-
resents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim by the court          
. . . .”). 
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In contrast, Younger does not apply because there are no longer pend-
ing proceedings in state court.
240
 
A few observations can be made based on a comparison of these 
scenarios.  First, in some cases Rooker-Feldman “does no additional 
work.”
241
  When the requirements of both Younger abstention and 
preclusion law are met, a combination of those two doctrines will bar 
a federal court action in all four scenarios, rendering Rooker-Feldman 
superfluous.  For example, if state officials file a civil enforcement ac-
tion in state court, Younger protects that proceeding from federal 
court interference until the exhaustion of state appellate remedies.
242
  
By that point, there is a final state court judgment that carries preclu-
sive effect.
243
 
Second, it would be a mistake to conclude that Rooker-Feldman is 
superfluous in all cases.  To the contrary, there are situations in 
which Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars suit.  The vast ma-
jority of state court civil cases are not entitled to protection under 
Younger.
244
  Several states do not give preclusive effect to judgments 
when an appeal is pending,
245
 and no state gives preclusive effect to 
an interlocutory order.
246
  Thus, Rooker-Feldman often is the only doc-
trine preventing aggrieved litigants from collaterally attacking a 
judgment in federal court while state court appeals are still pending.  
Additionally, to the extent Rooker-Feldman protects state court inter-
 
 240 See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608 (holding that a party “must exhaust his state ap-
pellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court”). 
 241 Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1139 (“If another doctrine (such as 
preclusion or the Younger doctrine) would deprive the federal court of jurisdiction, 
Rooker-Feldman does no additional work.”). 
 242 See Huffman, 420 U.S. at 608. 
 243 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 cmt. b (1982). 
 244 Younger prevents federal court interference with private-party state court civil 
actions only when the litigation involves “important state interests,” meaning the civil 
suit bears “a close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature.”  Middlesex Cnty. 
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).  Not surprisingly, 
most civil actions filed in state courts do not implicate these types of interests.  See 
CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: A 
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 27, 31 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/d_research/csp/2006_files/EWSC-
2007WholeDocument.pdf (noting that of the 16.6 million civil cases filed in state 
courts in 2005, 32 percent were contract cases, and 34 percent were small claims cas-
es). 
 245 See, e.g., Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005); Creech v. Adding-
ton, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–78 (Tenn. 2009). 
 246 See, e.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. Ct. 
App. 2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
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locutory orders, it would be the only doctrine performing that func-
tion in most civil cases as well. 
B. Applicability to Federal Court Cases Involving Nonparties to the State 
Court Proceedings 
Another area in which Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and 
preclusion law diverge is their applicability in federal court cases in-
volving nonparties to the state court proceedings.  Rooker-Feldman bars 
jurisdiction only when the federal court plaintiff was a party in the 
state court action; privity with a state court loser is not enough.
247
  
Additionally, because the doctrine applies only to claims “complain-
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments,”
248
 the federal-court 
defendant frequently will be a nonparty to the state court action—for 
example, a state court judge sued in federal court by an aggrieved lit-
igant.
249
 
In comparison, courts usually refuse to abstain under Younger 
when the federal court plaintiff is not a party to proceedings pending 
in state court.
250
  Younger, however, is somewhat broader than Rooker-
Feldman because it can apply to actions filed by nonparty plaintiffs 
when the plaintiff’s interests are “intertwined” with a pending state 
court prosecution.
251
  Such circumstances are rare—Younger is not 
triggered merely by similar interests or common counsel.
252
  Instead, 
 
 247 Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006) (per curiam).  But see id. at 466 n.2 
(“[W]e need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in 
which Rooker-Feldman may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state 
proceeding. . . .”); see also Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1141 (suggesting 
that the application of Rooker-Feldman to plaintiffs who were not parties to state court 
proceedings “would run afoul of the minimal requirements of due process”). 
 248 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
 249 E.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D. Dec. 
22, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 15, 
2010). 
 250 See, e.g., Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled 
on other grounds by Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968–69 (9th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc).   
 251 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 345, 348 (1975) (holding that Younger barred 
theater owners from interfering with a pending state court prosecution against the 
theater’s employees, in part because the owners’ “interests and those of their em-
ployees were intertwined”).  Some lower federal courts, however, have refused to ap-
ply Younger to suits filed by nonparties as a matter of course.  E.g., Allen v. Allen, 48 
F.3d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 252 E.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928–29 (1975) (holding that 
Younger did not apply; although the federal court plaintiffs were “represented by 
common counsel” and had “similar business activities and problems” as the state 
court defendants, they were “unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and man-
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abstention is appropriate only when the federal-court plaintiff’s in-
terests are “so intertwined with those of the state court party that di-
rect interference with the state court proceeding is inevitable.”
253
 
The application of preclusion law to nonparties highlights signif-
icant differences with the other two doctrines.  On the one hand, 
claim preclusion is broader than Rooker-Feldman and Younger because 
it can be invoked not only by state court litigants, but also those in 
privity with state court litigants.
254
  On the other hand, claim preclu-
sion is narrower because it applies only if both the plaintiff and the 
defendant are in privity with parties to the state court action.
255
  Thus, 
unlike Rooker-Feldman, claim preclusion would not prevent an ag-
grieved litigant from attacking a state court judgment in federal court 
as long as the litigant sues the state court judge or other individuals 
who are not in privity with the state court parties.
256
 
Likewise, issue preclusion is both broader and narrower than the 
other doctrines when applied to nonparties.  Although neither 
Rooker-Feldman nor Younger applies when the federal court plaintiff is 
not a party to the state court proceedings, offensive nonmutual issue 
preclusion might nonetheless prevent relitigation of certain issues.
257
  
If the state court judgment is rendered in a jurisdiction that requires 
mutuality, however, the judgment will carry no issue preclusive effect 
as long as the federal court plaintiff names different or additional 
parties.
258
 
 
agement”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 471 n.19 (1974) (“The pending pros-
ecution of petitioner’s handbilling companion does not affect petitioner’s action for 
declaratory relief.”). 
 253 Green, 255 F.3d at 1100; see also Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 F. 
App’x 630, 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that Younger applies only when nonparties to 
the state action “seek to directly interfere” with the state court proceedings); Spargo 
v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 84 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because 
plaintiffs’ claims are essentially derivative, this case presents one of the narrow cir-
cumstances in which Younger may properly extend to bar claims of third-parties who 
are not directly involved in the pending state action.”). 
 254 E.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998); N. 
States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1995). 
 255 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 178, at 723 (“When new parties are in-
volved, the courts generally have ruled that the two actions do not constitute a single 
cause of action or claim and thus are not barred by res judicata.”). 
 256 Sherry, supra note 10, at 1095. 
 257 See, e.g., Riverdale Dev. Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ark. 
2004); Exotics Hawai’i-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 90 P.3d 250, 263 
(Haw. 2004); Preferred Am. Ins. v. Dulceak, 706 N.E.2d 529, 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 258 See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1093 (“[S]ince some states still adhere to mutuali-
ty requirements, the mere addition of new parties will prevent the full application of 
preclusion doctrines in some cases.”). 
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C. Applicability of the Doctrines in the Context of State Court Civil and 
Criminal Proceedings 
Application of Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclu-
sion law also differs depending on whether the state court proceed-
ings are civil or criminal.  Although Rooker-Feldman undoubtedly bars 
collateral attacks of state court judgments in civil cases,
259
 the protec-
tion it offers to criminal convictions is much more limited.
260
  Federal 
habeas corpus statutes authorize federal court review of certain state 
court criminal judgments,
261
 significantly restricting Rooker-Feldman’s 
applicability in the criminal context.
262
  Nevertheless, federal courts 
occasionally use the doctrine to bar non-habeas claims seeking review 
of state court criminal convictions.
263
 
Unlike Rooker-Feldman, the primary purpose of Younger absten-
tion is the prevention of federal court interference with state court 
criminal proceedings.
264
  Although the doctrine requires deference to 
some state court civil proceedings, it does so only when those cases 
are filed by state officials or involve important state interests (i.e., in-
terests “necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for 
the functioning of the state judicial system. . . .”
265
).
 
 Despite the Su-
preme Court’s expansion of Younger, most private-party actions in 
 
 259 Both Rooker and Feldman involved federal court claims seeking review and re-
jection of state court judgments in civil cases.  See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
460 U.S. 462, 475–76 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416–17 (1923). 
 260 See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 11, at 1152 (“Rooker-Feldman does no work 
in criminal defense cases.”). 
 261 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006). 
 262 See, e.g., Gruntz v. Cnty. of L.A., 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 
(“[F]ederal habeas-corpus law turns Rooker-Feldman on its head.”); Sherry, supra note 
10, at 1101 (“Petitions for habeas corpus are an explicit exception to Rooker-Feldman, 
so that lower federal courts do serve as courts of appeal for state court criminal con-
victions.”). 
 263 Invocation of Rooker-Feldman in the criminal context usually arises when a de-
fendant is convicted of a crime in state court, and then files a claim under § 1983 in 
federal court.  See, e.g., Petrey v. Bartlett, No. 09-118-WOB, 2009 WL 2760906, at *4–5 
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 26, 2009); Poole v. Kolomitz, No. 09-cv-01741-BNB, 2008 WL 4829849, 
at *1–3 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2008). 
 264 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 
1141, 1171 (1988) (noting that Younger abstention was “[o]riginally limited in appli-
cation to pending state criminal proceedings” before its expansion to civil enforce-
ment actions). 
 265 Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 
(1982). 
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state court presumably do not implicate important state interests and 
thus fail to trigger the doctrine’s protection.
266
 
To the extent that a state court criminal or civil proceeding pro-
duces a final judgment on the merits, that judgment is entitled to 
preclusive effect.  Preclusion law is not limited to judgments in civil 
proceedings; a valid, final judgment in a criminal case also can have 
issue preclusive effect in a subsequent civil case.
267
  There are some 
limitations to the preclusive effect of criminal judgments, however.
268
  
Most notably, acquittals in criminal proceedings do not carry preclu-
sive effect in a civil lawsuit when the two proceedings use different 
burdens of proof.
269
 
Regardless, the main observation that should be made at this 
point is that Rooker-Feldman applies more widely to collateral attacks of 
state court judgments in civil actions, while Younger primarily applies 
to federal actions that interfere with state court criminal proceedings.  
This represents a significant difference in the scope of these two doc-
trines. 
D. Types of Claims Barred by Each Doctrine 
Rooker-Feldman, Younger, and the preclusion law doctrines each 
bar a distinct category of federal court claims.  The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine applies to federal court claims “complaining of injuries 
caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review 
and rejection of those judgments.”
270
  The doctrine does not prevent 
litigants from filing claims complaining of injuries caused by a de-
 
 266 See supra note 244; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Or-
leans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989) (holding that Younger applies only to “state criminal 
prosecutions, to civil enforcement proceedings, and even to civil proceedings involv-
ing certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to per-
form their judicial functions” (citations omitted)); Paul J. Heald & Michael L. Wells, 
Remedies for the Misappropriation of Intellectual Property by State and Municipal Governments 
Before and After Seminole Tribe: The Eleventh Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 849, 913 (1998) (“Younger is not a general principle that ap-
plies across a range of state proceedings.  Instead, Younger is a narrow rule of defer-
ence . . . .”). 
 267 See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568–69 
(1951); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Stites, 258 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001); Kow-
alski v. Gagne, 914 F.2d 299, 302 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 268 See generally 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 167, § 132.02[4][d]. 
 269 See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361–62 
(1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982). 
 270 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). 
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fendant or a third party,
271
 and it does not prohibit general challenges 
to the constitutionality of state laws.
272
  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
appears to have reigned in Feldman’s “inextricably intertwined” in-
quiry
273
—as long as the federal action “present[s] some independent 
claim,” jurisdiction exists.
274
 
Younger abstention bars federal suits that interfere with pending 
state court proceedings rather than claims seeking relief from a state 
court judgment.
275
  Although a limited amount of overlap may exist 
between Rooker-Feldman and Younger while cases are pending in state 
court,
276
 significant differences exist between the types of claims pro-
hibited by each doctrine.  Most importantly, Rooker-Feldman extends 
to claims for damages,
277
 while some circuits apply Younger only to 
claims seeking injunctive or declaratory relief.
278
 
The circumstances in which preclusion law applies also are sig-
nificantly different from those implicating Rooker-Feldman or Younger.  
Claim preclusion bars relitigation of claims that could have been liti-
 
 271 See, e.g., PJ ex rel. Jensen v. Wagner, 603 F.3d 1182, 1194 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Knutson v. City of Fargo, 600 F.3d 992, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 272 E.g., Carter v. Burns, 524 F.3d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 273 See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 85, at 3–4 (“[T]he ‘inextricably inter-
twined’ formulation, although not expressly repudiated or limited, appears to have 
been relegated to—at most—some secondary role and in any event [is] no longer . . . 
a general or threshold test.”). 
 274 Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (citing Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163–64 (9th 
Cir. 2003); GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)); 
accord Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011).  
 275 See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 
41 (1971). 
 276 It is possible that both Younger and Rooker-Feldman bar federal claims seeking 
injunctive relief from a state court interlocutory order.  See, e.g., Pieper v. Am. Arbi-
tration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rooker-Feldman 
barred a litigant’s claim for injunctive relief following a state court interlocutory or-
der); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 
973 F.2d 169, 172, 175–76 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Younger abstention barred a 
litigant’s claim for relief from a series of state court interlocutory orders). 
 277 See, e.g., Hunter v. Supreme Court of N.J., 951 F. Supp. 1161, 1174–75 (D.N.J. 
1996); see also Sherry, supra note 10, at 1125–26 (arguing that, for purposes of Rooker-
Feldman, “there should be no difference between federal suits seeking injunctive or 
declaratory relief and those seeking damages”). 
 278 See, e.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (“[A]pplication of the Younger doctrine is inappropriate where the litigant 
seeks money damages for an alleged violation of § 1983 . . . .” (internal citations 
omitted)); Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Younger ab-
stention doctrine does not apply to a suit seeking only damages.”).  But see Gilbertson 
v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that most cir-
cuits apply Younger to damages claims). 
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gated in the prior suit;
279
 issue preclusion prevents relitigation of is-
sues “actually litigated” and “necessarily decided.”
280
  In contrast, cases 
barred by Rooker-Feldman do not involve relitigation of state court 
claims or issues for a simple reason: a litigant cannot complain of in-
juries caused by a state court judgment before that judgment exists.
281
  
Moreover, Younger’s rule against interference with “pending” state 
court proceedings will rarely overlap with claim and issue preclusion, 
which both require a “final” judgment on the merits.
282
  Thus, the 
type of claims barred by Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and pre-
clusion law are distinct and rarely overlap. 
In sum, significant distinctions exist between these doctrines.  
Various scenarios involving the status of state court proceedings at 
the time of filing of the federal case show that Rooker-Feldman will be 
superfluous in some cases but vitally important in others.  When the 
federal suit includes individuals who were nonparties to the state 
court action, the scope of preclusion law is broader than Rooker-
Feldman and Younger in some jurisdictions but narrower in others.  
Younger abstention offers greater protection to state court criminal 
cases; in contrast, Rooker-Feldman more commonly arises in the con-
text of civil actions.  Perhaps most importantly, each doctrine targets 
a separate and distinct category of forbidden claims. 
VI. ARTICULATING ROOKER-FELDMAN’S UNIQUE ROLE 
With these differences in mind, it is possible to answer the key 
question left open by the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Exxon 
 
 279 Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 153 (3d Cir. 
2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).  
 280 E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001) (quoting 
Campion v. State, 876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994)); Gonzalez v. Superior Court of 
Santa Clara Cnty. (Fireside Bank Cases), 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85 (Ct. App. 2010).  
 281 See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1093 (noting that preclusion law would not bar a 
federal court claim that “seeks to rectify the harm done by the state suit itself” be-
cause “the harm alleged in the federal suit does not arise from the same transaction 
as the original state suit”). 
 282 See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13 cmt. b, 27 cmt. k (1982).  In rare cases, there may be overlap be-
tween preclusion law and Younger abstention.  Many states give preclusive effect to 
judgments regardless of whether an appeal is pending.  E.g., Wyatt v. Wyatt, 65 P.3d 
825, 831 (Alaska 2003); Patton v. Klein, 746 A.2d 866, 869 n.6 (D.C. 1999).  Addi-
tionally, state court proceedings remain “pending” for purposes of Younger absten-
tion until the state appellate process has run its course.  See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 
420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975).  Thus, both Younger and preclusion law may bar a federal 
court plaintiff from collaterally attacking a state court judgment while state appeals 
are pending. 
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Mobil and Lance: What unique role does Rooker-Feldman play in pre-
venting federal court interference with state court litigation? 
Based on the analysis above, there are two unique roles that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine can play.  The first is somewhat obvious: 
Rooker-Feldman is the only doctrine that bars federal claims complain-
ing of injuries caused by final state court judgments.
283
  The second is 
more subtle and would require some circuits to interpret the doctrine 
more broadly than they have in the past: only Rooker-Feldman bars col-
lateral attacks on non-final state court judgments in civil cases lacking 
important state interests or where plaintiff seeks monetary relief.
284
  
As the following discussion shows, it is unlikely that Younger absten-
tion or preclusion law would bar such claims. 
A. Only Rooker-Feldman Bars Federal Claims Complaining of Injuries 
Caused by Final State Court Judgments 
The first situation in which Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role 
occurs when a state court loser exhausts her state appellate reme-
dies
285
 and then files a claim in federal district court that complains of 
injuries caused by the state court judgment itself.  This scenario un-
doubtedly meets the Exxon Mobil test, and thus, Rooker-Feldman would 
bar plaintiff’s federal court action.
286
 
Rooker-Feldman plays a vital role in these types of situations be-
cause neither Younger abstention nor preclusion law would bar plain-
tiff’s federal action.  First, Younger is inapplicable because there is no 
pending state court proceeding—plaintiff has exhausted her state 
appellate remedies.
287
  Second, preclusion law also is inapplicable.  
Plaintiff could not have raised her claim in the state court action be-
cause the claim complains of injuries caused by the state court judg-
ment itself.
288
  For the same reason, the issues underlying plaintiff’s 
 
 283 See infra Part VI.A. 
 284 See infra Part VI.B. 
 285 In terms of the status of state court proceedings at the time of filing, this situ-
ation resembles the fourth scenario discussed in Part V.A above. 
 286 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) 
(holding that Rooker-Feldman bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceed-
ings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judg-
ments”). 
 287 See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608 (1975). 
 288 See Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 275 F. App’x 149, 152–53 (3d 
Cir. 2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).  
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claim could not have been “actually litigated” and “necessarily decid-
ed” in the state court action.
289
 
If plaintiff files her federal action against a defendant who was 
not a party to the state court lawsuit (for example, the state court 
judge), there are additional reasons why preclusion law does not ap-
ply.  The requirements of claim preclusion are not met because the 
second action is not between the same parties or their privies.
290
  Ad-
ditionally, if the state court judgment was rendered in a jurisdiction 
that requires mutuality, issue preclusion would be inapplicable as 
well.
291
 
Even if this were the extent of Rooker-Feldman’s role, the doctrine 
would be both significant and necessary.  Aggrieved litigants file fed-
eral court actions against state courts (and their judges) with surpris-
ing frequency.
292
  Thus, Rooker-Feldman plays an important role by bar-
ring jurisdiction in these types of cases. 
B. Only Rooker-Feldman Bars Collateral Attacks on Non-Final State 
Court Judgments in Civil Cases Lacking Important State Interests, or 
when a Plaintiff Seeks Monetary Relief 
The second situation in which Rooker-Feldman plays a unique role 
occurs when a state court loser files a claim in federal district court 
complaining of injuries allegedly caused by either a state court inter-
locutory order or a final state court judgment for which an appeal is 
pending.
293
 
Younger abstention will not bar plaintiff’s federal claim as long as 
the state court judgment was rendered in private-party civil litigation 
 
 289 E.g., Griswold v. City of Homer, 34 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Alaska 2001); Gonzalez v. 
Superior Court of Santa Clara Cnty. (Fireside Bank Cases), 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 84–85 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
 290 See, e.g., Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998); 
N. States Power Co. v. Bugher, 525 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Wis. 1995); FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
supra note 178, at 723. 
 291 See, e.g., Leon C. Baker, P.C. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
821 So. 2d 158, 165 (Ala. 2001); Ritch v. State, 14 So. 3d 1104, 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2009); U.S. Cold Storage, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 576 S.E.2d 415, 417–18 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003). 
 292 See, e.g., Klaudt v. Dooley, No. Civ. 10-4091-KES, 2010 WL 5391571 (D.S.D. 
Dec. 22, 2010); Dempsey v. Clerk, Supreme Judicial Court, No. 10-12044-PBS, 2010 
WL 5283290 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2010); Gdowski v. Lant, No. 4:10CV3233, 2010 WL 
5257010 (D. Neb. Dec. 15, 2010); Nali v. Oakland Cnty. Friend of Court, No. 10-
14844, 2010 WL 5101041 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2010). 
 293 In terms of the status of state court proceedings at the time of filing, this situ-
ation would fall in either the second or third scenarios discussed in Part V.A above.   
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that did not implicate important state interests.
294
  Alternatively, even 
if the federal claim complains of injuries caused by a state court 
judgment in a criminal prosecution or civil enforcement action, 
plaintiff may be able to circumvent Younger by filing a claim for mon-
etary damages.
295
 
Preclusion law is inapplicable if plaintiff’s claim complains of in-
juries caused by a state court interlocutory order, which carries no 
preclusive effect.
296
  Alternatively, even if plaintiff’s federal action 
complains of injuries caused by a final judgment, some states refuse 
to give the judgment preclusive effect as long as appeals are pending 
in state court.
297
  As a result, Rooker-Feldman could play a valuable role 
by protecting these judgments. 
Application of Rooker-Feldman to these types of cases would re-
quire some circuits to interpret the doctrine more broadly.  Most cir-
cuits use the doctrine to protect final judgments, even if appeals are 
pending in state court.
298
  But many circuits have held that Rooker-
Feldman does not apply to state court interlocutory orders.
299
  The bet-
ter rule is the approach used by circuits that extend the doctrine to 
all state court decisions, whether final or interlocutory in nature.
300
  
Such an approach is more consistent with the rationale behind the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and has the added advantage of filling an im-
 
 294 See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 
432 (1982). 
 295 See, e.g., Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 285–86 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (Younger abstention does not bar damages claims); Alexander v. Ieyoub, 
62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (same).  But see Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 
978 n.13 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (noting that most circuits apply Younger to dam-
ages claims). 
 296 See, e.g., Saizan v. Pointe Coupee Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 559, 563–64 (La. 
Ct. App. 2010); McMahon v. Geldersma, 317 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 297 See, e.g., Rantz v. Kaufman, 109 P.3d 132, 141 (Colo. 2005) (judgments subject 
to appeal do not have preclusive effect); Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 377–
78 (Tenn. 2009) (same). 
 298 See Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (Rooker-
Feldman applies to lower state court decisions); Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 
83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same).  But see Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 
1266, 1278–79 (11th Cir. 2009) (Rooker-Feldman does not protect judgments subject 
to appeals in state court); In re Hodges, 350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) 
(same). 
 299 See, e.g., TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); In re 
Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 300 Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003); Pieper, 336 
F.3d at 462; see also Dustin E. Buehler, Revisiting Rooker-Feldman: Extending the Doc-
trine to State Court Interlocutory Orders, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 373, 408–14 (2009). 
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portant niche left uncovered by Younger abstention and preclusion 
law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Clear distinctions exist between the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
Younger abstention, and preclusion law rules.  Articulating these dif-
ferences requires careful attention to the scope of each doctrine and, 
as is so often the case with rules that regulate the interaction between 
state and federal courts, the details are where the devil resides. 
Given the unique scope of each of these doctrines, it is surpris-
ing that federal courts confuse them so frequently.  Perhaps the rea-
son for the confusion lies not in the difficulty of the concepts, but in-
stead reflects the situation federal courts find themselves in when 
they invoke these doctrines.  Most federal court judges likely have a 
fairly strong reaction to a claim that attacks a state court judgment or 
proceeding—they know some doctrine must bar the claim.  The cer-
tainty of this answer may overshadow the subtleties of the doctrines.  
As a result, many courts inevitably use the wrong doctrine to achieve 
the right result. 
These doctrines are precise tools.  An appreciation for the dif-
ferences between Rooker-Feldman, Younger abstention, and preclusion 
law hopefully will go a long way toward ensuring that each plays a 
necessary and distinct role in our federal courts. 
 
